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VULNERABILITY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION AND 
MIGRATION GOVERNANCE 
Sylvie Da Lomba* 
Abstract 
I posit that the deployment of a vulnerability analysis premised on an universalistic idea of 
citizenship in international human rights adjudication is critical to good global international 
migration governance. I contend that the intrinsic human nature of the global phenomenon that 
is international migration calls for a human rights-based approach to governance. I identify 
international human rights adjudication as a core migration governance activity and argue that 
a vulnerability analysis enables regional human rights adjudicating bodies to advance good 
governance by extending protections to all migrants and producing narratives that help 
elucidate the dynamics of international migration.  
 
Resumen 
Postulo que el despliegue de un análisis de vulnerabilidad basado en una idea universalista de 
la ciudadanía en la litigación internacional de derechos humanos es fundamental para una 
buena gobernanza de la migración internacional a nivel mundial. Sostengo que la naturaleza 
humana intrínseca al fenómeno global que es la migración internacional requiere un enfoque 
de la gobernanza basado en los derechos humanos. Identifico la litigación internacional de los 
derechos humanos como una actividad central de gobernabilidad migratoria y sostengo que un 
análisis de vulnerabilidad permite a los sistemas regionales de protección de derechos humanos 
promover la buena gobernanza extendiendo su tutela a todos los migrantes y produciendo 




In this paper, I theorise vulnerability as a foundation and tool of international human rights law 
(IHRL) with a view to enabling regional human rights adjudicating bodies to fulfil their role as 
key actors in good global international migration governance (GIMG). The focus on regional 
bodies is explained by the prevalence of trans-regional state initiatives in the area of 
international migration.1  
                                                          
1
 See Section 2.2 for examples of trans-regional state initiatives in the field of international migration. 
  
I posit that the deployment of a vulnerability analysis premised on an universalistic idea of 
citizenship fundamentally transforms the IHRL subject, the aim of IHRL and the adjudication 
process. I show how the proposed approach significantly mitigates the acute tensions that exist 
between human rights protection and the exercise of the Government immigration power and 
in so doing extends protections to all PLJUDQWV+HUH ,GRQRWFKDOOHQJHWKHVWDWH¶VULJKW WR
control immigration;2 what I challenge is the notion that states can fully control their borders - 
it is well-established that borders are inescapably porous -3 DQG WKH LGHD WKDW WKH VWDWH¶V
VRYHUHLJQULJKWWRFRQWUROLPPLJUDWLRQFDQWUXPSWKHSURWHFWLRQRIPLJUDQWV¶KXPDQULJKWV 
I start by examining the function of human rights in GIMG and make the case for a human 
rights-based approach to migration governance. Having explored the role of regional human 
rights adjudicating bodies in GIMG, I investigate the deployment of a vulnerability analysis in 
regional human rights adjudication with a view to reassessing the significance afforded to the 
government immigUDWLRQSRZHUDQGHQDEOLQJKXPDQULJKWVERGLHV¶WUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWRJRRG
GIMG actors.  
2. HUMAN RIGHTS AND GIMG 
2.1 DEFINING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE  
Global governance is a fuzzy and often poorly defined FRQFHSW5XJJLHFRQWHQGVWKDW³[g]lobal 
governance is generally defined as an instance of governance in the absence of government´4 
According to Thakur et al³[i]t consists of formal and informal arrangements that provide more 
order and stability for a world in constant and rapid flux than would occur naturally - the range 
of international cooperatLRQZLWKRXWDZRUOGJRYHUQPHQW´5 GOREDOJRYHUQDQFH³highlights the 
move away from individual nation-states having absolute authority over policy-making 
towards a situation in which the behaviour of States and other actors is constrained and shaped 
by a range of institutions which exist beyond the nation-State´6 Actors in global governance 
include states, national institutions, local authorities, regional and international organisations 
                                                          
2 )RUDFULWLTXHRIWKHVWDWH¶VULJKWWRFRQWUROLPPLJUDWLRQVHH%6FKRWHOOn the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics 
and Immigration Policy (Oxon/New York, Routledge, 2012). 
3 6HHHJ/5&KDYH]³7KH&RQGLWLRQVRI,OOHJDOLW\´International Migration (2007), p. 192. 
4 -*5XJJLH³*OREDO*RYHUQDQFHDQGµ1HZ*RYHUQDQFH7KHRU\¶/HVVRQVIURP%XVLQHVVDQG+XPDQ
5LJKWV´Global Governance (2014), p. 5. 
5 57KDNXU%-RE06HUUDQRDQG'7XVVOH³7KH1H[W3KDVHLQWKH&RQVROLGDWLRQDQG([SDnsion of Global 
*RYHUQDQFH´Global Governance (2014), p. 1. 
6 $%HWWV³,QWURGXFWLRQ*OREDO0LJUDWLRQ*RYHUQDQFH´LQ$%HWWVHGGlobal Migration Governance 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 5. 
  
and non-governmental actors.7 These actors come with varying degrees of power as well as 
diverging ± if not competing ± interests and ideas and one of the purposes of governance is to 
accommodate this diversity.8 It is commonly accepted that global governance is of particular 
relevance to those issues that cannot be addressed by individual state action because they cross 
national borders.9 Accordingly, global governance has emerged and developed in fields such 
as international trade, communicable diseases and climate change. Moreover, with 
globalisDWLRQKHLJKWHQLQJµWUDQV-ERXQGDU\¶LQWHUFRQQHFWLYLW\´, the need for global governance 
has significantly grown.10  
Global governance, however, remains an ambiguous concept. The confusion surrounding 
the concept of global governance stems from the meaning of the term governance in the first 
instance, but also from the meaning of the term global. This term may be construed in two 
ZD\V³the top level scale of human activity or the sum of all scales of activity.´11 In my view, 
the latter understanding of the term global is preferable as it is congruent with the 
conceptualisation of global governance as a multi-level process. As Betts convincingly points 
RXW ³>Z@KDWPDNHVJRYHUQDQFH µJOREDO¶ LVQRW WKH µOHYHO¶ at which it is identified ±whether 
bilateral, regional, transnational or supranational ± but rather the fact that it is constraining or 
constitutive of the behaviour of [actors in global governance]´12 Based on this understanding 
of the term global, I investigate the role of regional human rights adjudicating bodies in GIMG. 
The meaning of the term governance is much more confused. Some understand governance as 
³a specific mode of social interaction whose logic differs from that of both markets and 
governments´13 In contrast with this narrow conceptualisation, others favour a broader 
                                                          
7 Inter-Parliamentary Union, International Labour Organization and United Nations Human Rights Office of the 
High Commissioner, Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 24, 2015, Migration, Human Rights and Governance, 
p. 136, <www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---exrel/documents/publication/wcms_415618.pdf>. 
8 Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), Report of the Global Commission on International 
Migration, October 2015, Migration in an Interconnected World: New directions for Action, p. 65, 
<www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationresources/reports/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf>. 
9 Thakur, Job, Serrano and Tussle, supra n. 5, p. 1. 
10 A. Betts, Global Economic Governance Programme, GEG Working Paper 2008/43, November 2008, Global 
Migration Governance, p. 6, 
<www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/Betts_GEG%20WP%202008_43.pdf>. 
11 K. 'LQJZHUWKDQG33DWWEHUJ³*OREDO*RYHUQDQFHDVD3HUVSHFWLYHRQ:RUOG3ROLWLFV´Global 
Governance (2006), p. 188. 
12 Betts, supra n. 6, p. 4. 
13 Dingwerth and Pattberg, supra n. 11, p. 188. 
  
definition of governance. For Rosenau, JOREDOJRYHUQDQFHHQFRPSDVVHV³systems of rule at all 
levels of human activity ± from the family to the international organization in which the pursuit 
of goals through the exercise of control hDVWUDQVQDWLRQDOUHSHUFXVVLRQV´14 While there is merit 
LQ5RVHQDX¶VDWWHPSWWRRIIHUDQDOO-encompassing definition of global governance, Filkenstein 
rightly observes that such broadness makes it very difficult to identify what does not form part 
of global governance and therefore does not help clarify the concept.15 He convincingly argues 
that the notion of activity should be central to the concept of global governance; governance is 
DERXW³GRLQJVRPHWKLQJ´16 With governance characterised as an activity, it becomes possible 
³to identify and examine the processes of influence, decision, and action that shape or 
determine [a range of government-like activities occurring beyond the nation-state]´17  
Filkenstein further stresses that governance is not confined to rule-making, but covers a much 
wider array of activities such as implementation and action programmes.18  
2.2. GIMG 
As a global and cross-national phenomenon, international migration provides a compelling 
case for global governance. GIMG both recognises and responds to the inherently trans-
boundary and global nature of international migration and to the interdependence of stateV¶
migration policies. Yet, as states continue to regard migration as a core attribute and 
manifestation of their sovereignty, progress in GIMG has been slow. Although ³migration [is] 
escaping the control of even the most capable governments, global governance of international 
migration [is] seen as an intUXVLRQRQQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\´19 It follows that GIMG remains 
incoherent, fragmented and complex.  
%HWWV¶FRQFHSWXDOisation of GIMG as an ensemble of processes taking place at three levels, 
namely multilateralism, trans-regionalism and embeddedness, illuminates the intricacies of 
global governance in this field.20 Multilateralism is thin in the field of international migration. 
While a significant number of multilateral actions were initiated from around the turn of the 
                                                          
14 -15RVHQDX³*RYHUQDQFHLQWKH7ZHQW\-)LUVW&HQWXU\´Global Governance (1995), p. 13. 
15 /6)LQNHOVWHLQ³:KDWLV*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH´Global Governance (1995), p. 368. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 368-369. 
18 Ibid., p. 369-370.  
19 .1HZODQG³7KH*RYHUQDQFHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO0LJUDWLRQ0HFKDQLVPV3URFHVVHVDQG,QVWLWXWLRQV´
Global Governance (2010), p. 332. 
20 Betts, supra n. 6, p. 11-18. 
  
millennium - many of which under the auspices of the United Nations -,21 multilateral activity 
did not result in the development of an effective international migration regime. One notable 
exception is in the area of refugee protection; the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol together with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees provide 
the international legal and institutional framework for refugee status.22 However, there is no 
comparable framework for other categories of migrants. Constitutive elements of such a 
framework do exist, but they do not form a coherent and comprehensive international regime.23 
There is no space to discuss the development of an international migration regime; one major 
pitfall to avoid, however, is the creation of a regime based on a rigid distinction between forced 
and voluntary migration and sub-types of migration. These categorisations rest on legalistic 
and policy-shaped concepts and definitions that are not grounded in the realities and 
complexities of international migration.24 Considering the failings of multilateralism, states are 
increasingly turning to trans-regional arrangements; hence my focus on regional human rights 
adjudicating bodies. Trans-regionaOJRYHUQDQFHFDQEHGHILQHGDV³sets of formal and informal 
institutions that cut across and connect different geographical regions constituting and 
constraining the behaviour of States and non-State actors in a givHQSROLF\ILHOG´25 This is, for 
                                                          
21 These actions include: the appointment of a special rapporteur on human rights of migrants by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights; the adoption of the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (Migrant Workers Convention), 18 December 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into 
force 1 July 2003; creation of the Global Migration Group by the Secretary-General of the UN to coordinate 
multilateral initiatives in the field of migration; and the 2003 launch of the Global Commission on International 
Migration in 2003 by the Secretary-General of the UN and several States. For a more comprehensive list of 
multilateral initiatives, see: Newland, supra n. 19, p. 332-333.  
22 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention),  28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, entered 
into force 22 April 1954; and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol), 31 January 1967, 606 
U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force 4 October 1967. While the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
oversees the implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, it lacks authority to issue binding 
pronouncements on the interpretation and application of these instruments and to bring enforcement actions 
against states. 
23 6&DVWOHV³7KH)DFWRUVWKDW0DNHDQG8QPDNH0LJUDWLRQ3ROLFLHV´International Migration Review 
(2004), p. 876-877. 
24 Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, SDQG5=HWWHU³/DEHOOLQJ5HIXJHHV)RUPLQJDQG7UDQVIRUPLQJ
D%XUHDXFUDWLF,GHQWLW\´Journal of Refugee Studies (1991), p. 39. 
25 Betts, supra n. 6, p.17-UHIHUULQJWR$%HWWV³7KH*OREDO*RYHUQDQFHRI0LJUDWLRQDQGWKH5ROHRI7UDQV-
regLRQDOLVP´LQ5.XQ]6/DYHQH[DQG03DQL]]RQHGVMulti-Layered Migration Governance: The 
Promise of Partnership (Oxon/New York, Routledge, 2011). 
  
example, the path chosen by the EU. With the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam conferring 
competences on the then European Community in the field of migration and asylum, the EU 
has become a prominent actor in trans-regional migration governance. As the most integrated 
supranational organisation in the world, the EU is unsurprisingly the organisation with the most 
far-reaching competences in the field of international migration. Other regional organisations 
such as the African Union and Mercosur have initiated collective actions on migration-related 
matters at intergovernmental level.26 Embeddedness constitutes the thLUG OHYHO LQ %HWWV¶
conceptualisation of GIMG. This antKURSRORJLFDOFRQFHSWUHIHUVWR³a situation when an area 
of social life does not exist as a recognized and compartmentalized area but is an integrated 
paUWRIWKHODUJHUVRFLDOV\VWHP´27 Applied to GIMG, embeddedness refers to activities which 
are not characterised as migration-related but are nonetheless instrumental in migration 
governance. For example, initiatives in the fields of international trade, global health, security 
and human rights contribute to shaping stateV DQG RWKHU DFWRUV¶ behaviour in the area of 
international migration.28 There is no doubt that human rights are deeply embedded in GIMG. 
For example, IHRL contributes to shaping stateV¶ EHKDYLRXU YLV-à-vis migrants. While the 
linkage between human rights and GIMG is not disputed, the significance of human rights in 
migration governance is. In this respect, I posit that human rights should be brought to the core 
of GIMG. 
2.3. A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO GIMG 
                                                          
26 )7UDXQHUDQG6:ROI³7KH1HJRWLDWLRQDQG&RQWHVWDWLRQRI(80LJUDWLRQ3ROLF\,QVWUXPHQWV$5HVearch 
)UDPHZRUN´European Journal of Migration and Law (2014), p. 5-6. Mercosur, which is a free trade and 
free movement regional organisation, has sought to transform the immigration regimes of Southern American 
States, notably by promoting a frameZRUNIRUWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHULJKWWRPLJUDWHDQGPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWV6HH
HJ$0DUJKHULWLV³3LHFHPHDO5HJLRQDO,QWHJUDWLRQLQWKH3RVW-Neoliberal Era: Negotiating Migration Policies 
ZLWKLQ0HUFRVXU´Review of International Political Economy (2SDQG%+LQHV³7KH5LJKWWR
0LJUDWHDVD+XPDQ5LJKW7KH&XUUHQW$UJHQWLQH,PPLJUDWLRQ/DZ´Cornell International Law Journal 
S2QWKH$IULFDQ8QLRQ¶VPLJUDWLRQIUDPHZRUNVHHHJ+.ODYHUW'LVFXVVLRQ3DSHU
Maastricht: ECDPM, (2011), African Union Frameworks for Migration: Current Issues and Questions for the 
Future, <ecdpm.org/publications/african-union-frameworks-migration-current-issues-questions-future/>. 
27 Betts, supra n 6, p. 14. 
28 For example, the World Trade Organization has identified migration has one of the major factors shaping the 
future of world trade (World Trade organization, WTO Publications 2013, World Trade Report 2013, Factors 
Shaping the Future of World Trade, p. 113-134, 
<www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report13_e.pdf>. See also World Health Organization, 
Resolution WHA61.17 on the Health of Migrants, 24 May 2008.  
  
I support a human rights-based approach to GIMG on two related grounds: the defining human 
nature of international migration and the need for good governance. International migration 
³has human beings at its centre´29 7KXV³YLUWXDOO\HYHU\WKLQJWRGRZLWKPLJUDWLRQ«FDQEH
viewHG WKURXJKDKXPDQULJKWV OHQV´30 The very strong linkage that exists between human 
rights and governance provides a compelling rationale for the development of a human rights-
based approach to GIMG.31 7KLV DSSURDFK ³works towards strengthening the capacities of 
rights-holders to make their claims and of duty-beaUHUV WRPHHW WKHLUREOLJDWLRQV´32 It also 
³provides practiFDOJXLGDQFHDQGFRQFUHWH WRROV´ to realise rights.33 Importantly, rather than 
being embedded in GIMG, human rights become its core. All GIMG actors accept, at least in 
theory, that migration governance has a human rights dimension. However, this (apparent) 
consensus masks disagreements, at times profound, over the importance of human rights. 
Markedly, wealthy receiving states acting both individually and collectively have taken issue 
with the characterisation of human rights as the cornerstone of GIMG on account of competing 
priorities such as border control, migration containment and security.34 Unsurprisingly, these 
actors favour the international migration management model. In contrast with a human rights-
based approach, the management model places the emphasis firmly on immigration control and 
containment.35 Ambivalence vis-à-vis human rights, however, should not be construed as an 
                                                          
29 Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, p. 135. 
30 Ibid., p. 140.  
31 See e.g.: UN, Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 2012, Migration and Human Rights: 
Improving Human Rights-Based Governance of International Migration, 
<www.refworld.org/docid/5243e8e74.html >. 
32 Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, p. 144.   
33 Ibid.  
34 For example, while the 2011 EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility purported to be migrant-centred, 
there has not been a human rights shift in EU migration governance initiatives (European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global approach to Migration and Mobility, 




of Migration and Law (2014), p. 38-39). 
35 UN, supra n. 31, p. 9. 
  
unsurmountable obstacle to the development of a human rights-based approach to GIMG. 
Navigating divergence and conflict is indeed a defining characteristic of global governance.  
The conceptualisation of good governance as fair and efficient is an uncontentious 
claim; however, how good governance can be achieved is. Here, I contend that a human rights-
based approach is critical to achieving good GIMG. To demonstrate my point, I draw on the 
work of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)36 and Betts.37  
First, I posit that a human rights-based approach provides the necessary underpinning 
for fair GIMG. The latter is understood to be principled, equitable and legitimate.38 GCIM 
convincingly stresses that a principled approach to migration governance requires that states 
fully comply with their IHRL obligations towards migrants.39 ³Treating people without respect 
for their rights places the act of migration outside the regulaWLRQDQGSURWHFWLRQRIWKHODZ´40 
It is well-GRFXPHQWHG WKDW ³[m]igrants whose rights are unprotected are more likely to be 
subMHFW WR DEXVH DQG H[SORLWDWLRQ´41 The international migration management model has 
SURYHG XQDEOH WR JXDUDQWHH PLJUDQW¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV EHFDXVH KXPDQ ULJKWV DUH VHW DJDLQVW
migration control and containment.42 
Fairness is also closely related to the concept of equity which is grounded in the 
principle of distributive justice. Applied to GIMG, equity requires that the benefits and costs 
of international migration be distributed equitably across stateVZKLFKLVQRWWKHFDVHLQWRGD\¶V
world.43 Evidence of inequity is apparent in the field of international labour migration where 
Powerful migrant-receiving states are able to take the migrants they want and leave the 
migrants they do not want. This HVVHQWLDOO\PHDQVWKDWPLJUDQWµUHFHLYLQJVWDWHV¶HQG
                                                          
36 GCIM, supra n. 8; Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, p. 136; and UN, supra n. 34.  
37 Betts, supra n. 6, p. 23-28. 
38 GCIM, supra n. 8, p. 53-55; Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, p. 140; and Betts, supra n. 6, p. 26-27. 
39 GCIM, supra n. 8, p. 53-55. See also Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, p. 140. 
40 Ibid., p. 39. 
41 Ibid.  
42 See e.g.: M. *DUOLFN³Protecting Rights and Courting Controversy: Leading Jurisprudence of the European 
&RXUWVRQWKH(8'XEOLQ5HJXODWLRQ´Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law (2015), p. 
63HHUV³7KH Dublin ,,,5HJXODWLRQ:KDW:LOO%H'LIIHUHQW"´Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law (2014), p. 46; and Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Resolution 2109 (2016), The 
Situation of Refugees and Migrants under the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016, 
<assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22738&lang=en>.  
43 Betts., supra n. 6, p. 26.  
  
up being the µPDNHUV¶ of migration governance whLOHPLJUDQWµVHQGLQJVWDWHV¶DUHWKH
µWDNHUV¶ of governance on the terms of the receiving states.44  
Similarly, with wealthy States eager to significantly curb the numbers of refugees and asylum 
seekers on their territory and externaOLVHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURWHFWLRQ³WKHPDMRULW\RIWKHZRUOG¶V
refugees are hosted by Southern sWDWHV´45 The management model is also problematic in that 
it supports top-down processes where migrants, civil society and NGOs as well as poorer 
sending states struggle to influence the apportionment of migration costs and benefits.46 In 
contrast with this model, a human rights-based approach not only shifts the focus of GIMG on 
migrants, it also calls for inclusive participation in migration governance.47 In addition to 
JLYLQJDYRLFHWRµZHDNHU¶*,0*DFWRUVLQFOXVLYHSDUWLFLSDWLRQVXSSRUWVHTXLWDEOHRXWFRPHV
thereby strengthening the linkage between GIMG and development.48 
Fair GIMG further necessitates legitimacy. In this context, this concept may be 
understood in two ways: in the normative sense ± KDYLQJ ³the right WR UXOH´ ± and in the 
sociological sense ± EHLQJ³widely believed to have the right to rule´49 Betts points out that 
OHJLWLPDF\LVFHQWUDOWRWKH³core trade-off within migration JRYHUQDQFH´50 Legitimacy requires 
³FDUU\LQJ SXEOLF VXSSRUW´ while demanding tKDW *,0* DFWRUV ³promote just outcomes and 
safeJXDUGWKHULJKWVRIµRXWVLGHUV¶51 In this respect, I posit that a human rights-based approach 
equips governance actors with the means to respond to the challenges posed by legitimacy. It 
SURYLGHV WKH QHFHVVDU\ XQGHUSLQQLQJ IRU WKH SURWHFWLRQ RI PLJUDQWV¶ KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG WKH
framework needed to discuss ways forward and negotiate conflict among governance actors.  
With the support of governance actors, especially receiving States, the proposed approach to 
GIMG can yield activity capable of receiving greater public support.  
                                                          
44 Ibidµ,QWKHDUHDRIORZ-skilled labour migration, Northern states can selectively include or exclude people 
IURPWKH6RXWKRQWKHLURZQWHUPV¶ibid.). 
45 Ibid.  
46 Castles, supra n. 23, p. 874. 
47 6RXWKHUQVWDWHV¶GHPDQGVIRUJUHDWHULQYROYHPHQWLQPXOWLODWHUDOLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQJRYHrnance are 
generally based on claims for equity (Betts, supra n. 6, p. 26). 
48 A human rights-EDVHGDSSURDFKWR*,0*HQDEOHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ³WREHFRPHDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRI
national, regional and global strategies for economic growth, in both the devHORSLQJDQGGHYHORSHGZRUOG´
(GCIM, supra n. 8, p. 23. On migration and development, see GCIM report (ibid., p. 23-31). 
49 $%XFKDQDQDQG5.HRKDQH³7KH/HJLWLPDF\RI*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH,QVWLWXWLRQV´Ethics and 
International Affairs (2006), p. 405. 
50 Betts, supra n. 6, p. 27. 
51 Ibid. 
  
In addition to fairness, good GIMG demands efficiency. This multifaceted concept 
encompasses notions of coherence, viability, sustainability and knowledgebase. Efficient 
GIMG aims to maximise the benefits and reduce the costs of international migration. It is well-
established that isolated state activity is ineffectual in achieving this aim.52 I contend that a 
human rights underpinning is the necessary pre-requisite to efficient GIMG. The international 
migration management model shows that the absence of human rights underpinning yields 
incoherent, impracticable and unsustainable policies and outcomes. This model perpetuates the 
µP\WK¶WKDWQDWLRQ-states can exercise full power over migration; states never had such power 
and the little they had has been significantly eroded by globalisation.53 Based on this flawed 
premise, the management model prioritises short and medium-term objectives that are 
primarily concerned with border and migration control. While I do not claim that these are 
mere peripheral issues, their characterisation as pillars and primary objectives of international 
migration systems has made for poor policy-making and ill-conceived initiatives.54 Conversely, 
because it envisages international through a human rights prism, a human rights-based 
approach causes all GIMG actors to re-evaluate and redefine the objectives of GIMG. It 
triggers an overhaul of GIMG in light of IHR/VWDQGDUGVDQGDVVXFKRIIHUV³significant support 
IRU WKHGHYHORSPHQWRILQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWFDQDGGUHVVJDSVLQPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWVZKHWKHUDW WKH
national, UHJLRQDO RU PXOWLODWHUDO OHYHO´55 Because it embraces the essence of international 
migration as a human phenomenon, a human rights-based approach provides an appropriate 
framework for developing a coherent, viable and sustainable system. This point can be 
illustrated by reference to international protection. A human rights-based approach compels 
GIMG actors, and especially (prospective) receiving states to reconsider their characterisation 
of the refugee question as a migration and border control issue. The EU experience shows that 
this kind of approach fails to produce efficient and fair responses to present and future 
international protection needs.56 Efficient GIMG further requires a comprehensive 
knowledgebase. This means that global governance must rest on an in-depth understanding of 
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53 Newland, supra n. 19, p. 334. 
54 For example, the shortcomings of the EU migration management approach are manifest in the EU-Turkey 
Agreement of 18 March 2016; this agreement has come under strong criticism for, inter alia, its failure to ensure 
WKDWPLJUDQWV¶KXPDQULJKWVDUHSURWHFWHG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55 Betts, supra n. 6, p. 28. 
56 See e.g.: G. S. Goodwin-*LOO³7KH0HGLWHUUDQHDQ3DSHUV$WKHQV1DSOHVDQG,VWDQEXO´International 
Journal of Refugee Law (2016), p. 276. 
  
the dynamics of international migration; without it, good GIMG cannot materialise as shown 
by the failings of the migration management model. The latter offers a skewed picture of 
international migration shaped by policy driven narratives. Conversely, because it 
acknowledges the intrinsic human nature of international migration, a human rights-based 
approach provides a sound basis for exploring the realities and intricacies of migration and 
facilitating the development of a comprehensive knowledgebase.57  
In sum, a human rights-based approach is critical to achieving good GIMG because it 
supports both fairness and efficiency. It furthers equitable outcomes congruent with IHRL 
obligations, thereby fostering legitimacy. Moreover, a human rights-based approach provides 
the necessary framework for the development of activities that can address present and future 
migration-related issues. 
3. GIMG AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATING BODIES 
Here, I make the case for the recognition of regional human rights adjudicating bodies as key 
actors in good GIMG, while acknowledging the factors that constrain their assuming this role. 
3.1. REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATING BODIES AS GIMG ACTORS 
The role of regional human rights adjudicating bodies in GIMG fundamentally differs with the 
type of governance model. In the migration management model, their role is peripheral on two 
accounts. First, international human rights adjudication is not considered a core governance 
DFWLYLW\EXWDQHPEHGGHGRQH6HFRQGO\WKLVPRGHOVHWVWKHSURWHFWLRQRIPLJUDQWV¶KXPDQ
rights against competing objectives such as border control and migration containment. Below, 
I show how tensions between human rights protection and the exercise of the government 
immigration power pervade international human rights adjudication and as such frustrate 
regioQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV DGMXGLFDWLQJ ERGLHV¶ transformation into GIMG actors. On the other 
hand, a human rights-based approach to GIMG makes international human rights adjudication 
a staple governance activity and consequently turns adjudicating bodies into significant 
migration governance actors. 
Regional human rights adjudicating bodies have been set up to ensure that states 
discharge their human rights obligations towards human rights-bearers. In keeping with the 
universal premise of IHRL and the development of a principled approach to GIMG, regional 
KXPDQULJKWV DGMXGLFDWLQJERGLHV FDQDGYDQFHPLJUDQWV¶ UHFRJQLWLRQDV IXOO\-fledged IHRL 
subjects, thereby bringing coherence to the international human rights regime and migration 
governance. An inclusionary construction of the IHRL subject which offsets immigration status 
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 Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra n. 7, p. 149. 
  
divides is also congruent with the realities and complexities of international migration.  The 
globalisation of human mobility makes migrant and migration categories ± voluntary or forced, 
regular or irregular, temporary, seasonal, long-term or permanent - extremely difficult to 
sustain.58 Critically, reliance on legalistic and flawed constructs not only constrains human 
rights protection for migrants, it also promotes simplistic and counterproductive accounts of 
international migration which thwart good governance. In contrast, an inclusive construction 
of the IHRL subject that recognises the complex nature of migratory flows helps promote 
coherence, viability and sustainability within GIMG.  
I further contend that international human rights adjudication can help shed much 
needed light on the dynamics of international migration. However, whether international 
adjudication can fulfil this function and help fill the knowledge gap on the linkage between 
migration and human rights is contingent on the approach to adjudication. To be more specific, 
it depends on the importance given to the government immigration power. As shown below, 
an approach to international human rights adjudication that defers to the state in matters of 
migration is informed by migration policy discourse and objectives. What is needed is an 
approach that advances our understanding of the migration-human rights nexus and, more 
generally, international migration dynamics. Thus, what is needed is an approach that prompts 
DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR PLJUDQWV¶ LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG VRFLHWDO UHODWLRQVKLSV DQG Vcrutinises the 
exercise of the government immigration power. Critically, the proposed approach provides a 
YDOXDEOH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR µWHVW¶ WKH XQVXEVWDQWLDWHG DVVXPSWLRQV WKDW FRPPRQO\ XQGHUSLQ
migration policies and policy narratives59 and as such promote evidence-based decision-
making.  
I accept that the transformation of regional human rights adjudicating bodies into 
µDFWLYLVW¶*,0*DFWRUVLVXQOLNHO\WRUHFHLYHDOO-around support. This begs the question of the 
risks ± real or unfounded ± that activism may entail for these bodies.  This issue arose in respect 
of the Inter-$PHULFDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶ ,$&W+5 pro homine approach in migrant 
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16. 
  
cases.60 This approach firmly puts human rights before the 6WDWH¶V right to control immigration. 
Typically, the IACtHR starts by affirming miJUDQWV¶ KXPDQ ULJKWV LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKHLU
immigration status. While the Court recognises the legitimacy of migration policies, this 
acknowledgment comes last in its reasoning and these policies are subject to full compliance 
with IHRL.61 7KH,$&W+5¶VDFWLvism has been both commended and frown upon.62 It has been 
criticisHGIRUWKUHDWHQLQJWKH&RXUW¶VOHJLWLPDF\HIILFLHQF\DQGXOWLPDWHO\LWVYHU\H[LVWHQFH
6RPHFRPPHQWDWRUVRSLQHWKDWWKH,$&W+5¶VDSSURDFKSXWVWKH,QWHU-American human rights 
system at risk because it rests on an interpretation of IHRL that has not received state consent.63 
2WKHUVSRVLWWKDWWKH&RXUW¶V³ideDOL]HGYLHZRIKXPDQULJKWVODZ´ lacks effective outcomes 
and take Advisory Opinion 18/03 as an example of the fDLOXUH RI WKH &RXUW¶V DSproach to 
DGYDQFHPLJUDQWV¶KXPDQULJKWVSURWHFWLRQ64 7KH\DUJXHWKDWDPRUH³GRZQWRHDUWK´ approach 
that focuses on specific issues would prove more effective than ambitious humanistic 
pronouncements as such an approach is more likely to receive societal and state support.65 In 
GHIHQFH RI WKH ,$&W+5¶V DFWLYLVP -XGJH &DQoDGR 7ULQGDGH VWUHVVHV WKDW KXPDQ ULJKWV
DGMXGLFDWLRQVKRXOGQRWEHµVXEMHFWHG¶WRWKHsWDWH¶V will; he eloquently remarks that  
It is not the function of the jurist simply to take note of what the States do, particularly 
the most powerful ones, which do not hesitate to VHHNIRUPXODVWRLPSRVHWKHLUµZLOO¶, 
                                                          
60 The term pro homine LVXVHGE\'HPERXUWRGHVFULEHWKH,$&W+5¶VDSSURDFKLQPLJUDQWFDVHV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Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants, Study of the European Court of Human Rights with an Inter-
American Counterpoint (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
61 The IACtHR requires compliance with the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) as well as other 
international human rights instruments (ACHR, 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 18 
July 1978). See e.g.: IACtHR (Advisory Opinion) 17 September 2003, Juridical Condition and Rights of 
Undocumented Migrants, OC-18/03; IACtHR (Judgment) 24 October 2012, Case of Nadege Dorzema et Al v. 
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62 Dembour, supra n. 60, p. 308-312. 
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European Journal of International Law (2008), p. 102. 
64 -/&DYDOODURDQG6(%UHZHU³5HHYDOXDWLQJ5HJLRQDO+XPDQRights Litigation in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Case of the Inter-$PHULFDQ&RXUW´, 102(4) American Journal of International Law (2008), p. 821. 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n. 66.  
65 Cavallaro and Brewer, supra n. 64, p. 821-824. 
  
including in relation to the treatment to be dispensed to the persons under [their] 
MXULVGLFWLRQ«$ERYHWKHZLOOLVWKHFRQVFLHQFH>66] 
In the saPHYHLQ'HPERXUREVHUYHV WKDW³timidity in the human rights field yields terrible 
results for thHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHKXPDQEHLQJ´ and convincingly argues that criticism levelled 
at the IACW+5¶VDGYLVRU\RSLQLRQVDQGMXGJPHQWVIRUWKHLUODFNRILPPHGLDWHHIIHFWLVXQIDLU
as judicial proQRXQFHPHQWV FDQ VHOGRP SURGXFH ³instantaneous effects´.67 Moreover, one 
should bear in mind thDWWKH,$&W+5¶VSURQRXQFHPHQWV³remain references in human rights 
law, upon which huPDQULJKWVODZ\HUVFDQUHO\´68 6LJQLILFDQWO\WKH,$&W+5¶Vpro homine 
approach is fitting with a human right-based approach to GIMG and the recognition of regional 
human rights adjudicating bodies as key governance actors. This approach has much in 
common with a vulnerability analysis. In particular, it significantly limits deference to the state 
in matters of migration. However, in contrast with a vulnerability analysis, a pro homine 
approach does not prompt an in-depth investigation intRPLJUDQWV¶VRFLHWDODQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
LQWHUDFWLRQV7KH,$&W+5VLPSO\EXWLPSRUWDQWO\LGHQWLILHVWKHSULPDU\FDXVHVRIPLJUDQWV¶
vulnerability and briefly comments on the role of the state in the treatment of migrants and the 
shaping of migratory patterns.69  
$UJXDEO\ WKH OHJLWLPDF\ REMHFWLRQ OHYHOOHG DW WKH ,$&W+5¶V DFWLYLVP FDQ DOVR EH
directed at the transformation of regional human rights adjudicating bodies into GIMG actors. 
Indeed, this process requires interpretations and applications of IHRL that rest on a strong 
universal underpinning that is likely to attract heavy criticism from (some) states and sections 
of public opinion. However, two counter-arguments can be made. First, as Judge Cançado 
7ULQGDGHSRLQWVRXWWKHPLVVLRQRI,+5/LVQRWWRµSOHDVH¶states but to uphold the universalistic 
and humanistic essence of IHRL. Secondly, while legitimate governance requires some degree 
of public support, it also demands that GIMG actors support just outcomes and safeguard 
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PLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWV70 Moreover, the transformation of human rights bodies into GIMG actors 
prompts an evidence-based approach to international human rights adjudication which 
SURPRWHV ³D FXOWXUH RI MXVWLILFDWLRQ´71 and therefore fosters legitimacy. The notion that 
unwarranted activism can alienate states and public opinion to the detriment of human rights 
protection is not peculiar to the LVVXHRIPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWV72 Crucially, the greatest risks to human 
ULJKWVV\VWHPVGRQRWDULVHIURPµXQSRSXODU¶GHFLVLRQVEXWIURPGHFLVLRQVWKDWHURGHSURWHFWLRQ
standards.  
3.2. BARRIERS TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADJUDICATING BODIES INTO GIMG ACTORS  
The barriers to the transformation of regional human rights adjudicating bodies into GIMG 
actors are rooted in the importance afforded to the government immigration power in IHRL. 
Its significance has far-reaching consequences in that it contributes to shaping the normative 
FRQWHQW RI ,+5/ DQG WKH ,+5/ VXEMHFW LQIOXHQFHV DSSURDFKHV WR PLJUDQWV¶ KXPDQ ULJKWV
adjudication; informs migrant and migration narratives in international human rights 
DGMXGLFDWLRQDQGSODFHVKXUGOHVRQPLJUDQWV¶DFFHVs to adjudication. However, this is not to 
say that the importance accorded to the government immigration power is the same across 
UHJLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVDGMXGLFDWLQJERGLHV)RUH[DPSOHWKH,$&W+5¶Vpro homine approach 
discussed above gives far less weight to the government immigration power than the European 
&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶(&W+5 reversal.73 In contrast with a pro homine approach, reversals 
put the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration first and human rights protection second. This type 
of approach is discussed below. 
,+5/¶V VWUXJJOHV WR H[WHQG SURWHFWLRQV WR PLJUDQWV DUH ZHOO NQRZQ74 These struggles are 
rooted in the state-centred nature of IHRL; the latter forms part of international law and as such 
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72 See, for example, the debate LQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPIROORZLQJWKH(&W+5¶VMXGJPHQWthat a blanket ban on 
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73 7KHWHUPUHYHUVDOLVXVHGE\'HPERXUWRGHVFULEHWKH(&W+5¶VDSSURDFKLQPLJUDQWFDVHV'HPERXUsupra n. 
60). 
74 See e.g.: A. Grear, Redirecting Human Rights: Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); and M-B Dembour and T Kelly, Are Human Rights for Migrants? 
  
is shaped by two interrelated principles, nDPHO\ WKH ³VWDWH FRQVHQW VXSHUQRUP´, 75 ³ZKLFK
relates to the sWDWH¶V SULPDU\ UROH LQ WKH FUHDWLRQ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ DQG HQIRUFHPHQW RI
international ODZ DQG QDWLRQDO VRYHUHLJQW\´76 7KXV ³inasmuch as the ascription and 
codification of rights move beyond national frames of reference, post-national rights remain 
oUJDQL]HGDW WKHQDWLRQDO OHYHO´77 It follows that the notion of universal human rights is set 
against the exercise of the government immigration power with two far-reaching correlated 
consequences. The government immigration power profoundly shapes the normative content 
of IHRL with the range of rights conferred on individuals varying with their legal status in the 
nation-state. For example, the Migrant Workers Convention confers a much wider range of 
rights on regular migrants than on irregular migrants.78 ,QHYLWDEO\ WKLV ³duality between 
XQLYHUVDOLVWLFULJKWV´ and the bounded nation-state affects the construction of the IHRL subject. 
Paradoxically, while rights are conferred on persons as human beings, IHRL assumes that the 
universal subject enjoys some degree of membership in the nation-state.79 Thus, rather than 
challenge the idea of national citizenship as closure and construct the IHRL subject in keeping 
with its universal premise, IHRL makes recognition as a fully-fledged human rights subject 
FRQWLQJHQW RQ RQH¶V OHJDO VWDWXV LQ WKH QDWLRQ-state. The construction of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) subject by the ECtHR typifies the nationalistic nature 
of the IHRL subject. Its prominent nationalistic dimension is attributable to the state-centred 
QDWXUHRI,+5/EXWLWLVH[DFHUEDWHGE\WKH&RXUW¶VUHYHUVDOLQPLJUDQWFDVHV This was patent 
LQWKH(&W+5¶VDSSURDFKLQN v. United Kingdom ZKLFKXQWLOUHFHQWO\KDGVKDSHGWKH&RXUW¶V
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European Journal of Health Law (2014), p. 347. 
77 <1XKR÷OX6R\VDOLimits of Citizenship, Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago/London, 
The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 157. 
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case law on the expulsion of the seriously ill.80 This much criticised approach81 was reassessed 
in an unanimous judgment of the Grand Chamber. In Paposhvili v. Belgium,82 the Court 
acknowledges that, by restricting Article 3 ECHR protection to cases where applicants were 
µFORVHWRG\LQJ¶LWKDG³deprived aliens who [were] seriously ill, but whose condition [was] 
less critical, of the benefit of that SURYLVLRQ´83 This judgment is to be welcome in that it helps 
fill the significant protection gap created by the N v. United Kingdom approach and brings the 
&RXUW¶VFDVH ODZRQ WKHH[SXOVLRQRI WKHVHULRXVO\ LOO FORVHU WR WKHSULQFLSOHV WKDWXQGHUSLQ
Article 3 ECHR protection.84 This judgement, however, softens rather than overturns the N v. 
United Kingdom approach. The Court does not abandon the notion that the general interest of 
WKHFRPPXQLW\PD\EHEDODQFHGDJDLQVWDSSOLFDQWV¶SURWHFWLRQXQGHU$UWLFOH ECHR; rather 
it justifies the balancing exercise inherent in the N v. United Kingdom approach,85 
notwithstanding the absolute nature of this provision.86 Importantly, the starting point of the 
ECtHR in Paposhvili v. Belgium remains the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration.87 Thus, this 
MXGJPHQW GRHV QRW UHYHUVH WKH (&W+5¶V UHYHUVDO The European Social Charter provides a 
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further example of the nationalistic nature of the IHRL subject;88 Charter rights are bestowed 
RQ³foreigners only in so far as they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working 
regularly within the teUULWRU\RI WKH3DUW\FRQFHUQHG´89 The European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR) has extended protections to irregular migrants when their human dignity is at 
stake,90 but their recognition as Charter subjects remains exceptional whether children or 
adults.91 The nationalistic nature of the IHRL subject is not her sole problematic feature. 
Protection gaps further arise from the conceptualisation of the IHRL subject as an invulnerable 
subject. This point is examined below in relation to the deployment of a vulnerability analysis 
in international human rights adjudication.  
Tensions between human rights protection and the exercise of the government 
immigration power also pervade international human rights adjudication. The resilience of 
human rights adjudication to the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration varies with the approach 
taken. For example, the IACtHR and the ECtHR deploy contrasted approaches with these 
Courts respectively prioritising human rights and the government immigration power. The 
(&65¶VDSSURDFKPD\EHGHVFULEHGDVDµVRIWUHYHUVDO¶LQWKDWWKH&RPPLWWHH¶Vµpro homine¶
UHDGLQJRIWKH(XURSHDQ6RFLDO&KDUWHU¶VSHUVRQDOVFRSHLVFRQVWULcted by its affirmation of the 
government immigration power.92 9DVWO\GLIIHULQJ³political, insWLWXWLRQDODQGVRFLDOFRQWH[WV´ 
in Latin America and Europe partly expODLQ GLIIHUHQFHV LQ DSSURDFKHV WR PLJUDQWV¶ KXPDQ
rights adjudication.93 Likewise, procedural differences across human rights systems partly 
DFFRXQWIRURQHERG\¶VWLPLGLW\DQGDQRWKHU¶VDXGDFLW\$UJXDEO\WKHODFNRIELQGLQJHIIHFW
                                                          
88 European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, C.E.T.S. No. 35, entered into force 26 February 1965; and Revised 
European Social Charter, 3 May 1996, C.E.T.S. No. 163, entered into force 1 July 1999. 
89 Point 1 of the Appendix to the European Social Charter and Revised European Social Charter (ibid.). 
90 ECSR (Decision on the Merits) 7 October 2004, Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France, 
Collective Complaint No. 14/2003; ECSR (Decision on the Merits) 20 October 2009, Defence for Children 
International (DCI) v. The Netherlands, Collective Complaint No. 47/2008; ECSR (Decision on the Merits) 23 
October 2012, Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, Collective Complaint No. 69/2011; and 
ECSR (Decision on the Merits) 10 November 2014, Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. The 
Netherlands, Collective Complaint No. 90/2013. 
91 Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, supra n. 90, paras. 35-36. 
92 Defence for Children International (DCI) v. The Netherlands, supra n. 90, para. 41. Significantly, the ECSR 
GLGQRWDIILUPWKH6WDWH¶VULJKWWRFRQWUROLPPLJUDWLRQZKHQLWEURXJKWLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVXQGHUWKHSURWHFWLRQRI
the European Social Charter for the first time (International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. 
France, supra n. 90). 
93 Dembour, supra n. 60, p. 16. 
  
RIWKH(&65¶VGHFLVLRQVPHDQVWKDWWKH&RPPLWWHHLVDWJUHDWHUµOLEHUW\¶WKDQWKH(&W+5WR
develop migrant-friendly interpretations and applications of human rights law. In addition to 
being contextualised, comparisons must be nuanced. In the same way as a pro homine approach 
cannot guarantee positive outcomes for migrants in all instances,94 reversals do not 
systematically confine migrants to the margins of human rights systems.95 However, it remains 
the case that approaches that take the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration as their starting point 
beget significant judicial deference in matters of migration, which inhibits scrutiny of the 
exercise of the government immigration power. This, in turn, makes for decision-making 
processes and outcomes that are informed by migration policy discourse and objectives.96  
Critically, approaches to international human rights adjudication profoundly shape 
migrant and migration narratives. Reversals produce narratives that are informed by migration 
policy discourse and objectives rather than being evidence-based. Two recurrent policy 
assumptions that permeate human rights pronouncements are the notions that welfare provision 
for migrants encourages migration and that irregular migrants deplete national resources.97 Yet 
these are contested claims; there is little evidence that welfare provision acts as a major pull 
factor.98 Similarly, the contention that many migrants abuse national resources is 
unsubstantiated.99 It follows that  adjudication narratives essentialisHPLJUDQWV¶ VRFLHWDO DQG
institutional relationships, problematise migrants and migration and ultimately fail to capture 
the realities of international migration. Typically, assumption-based narratives offer an 
DQWDJRQLVLQJSHUVSHFWLYHRQµXQGHVLUDEOH¶PLJUDQWVDQGUHFHLYLQJstateV¶UHVSHFWLYHLQWHUHVWV
                                                          
94 For example, Advisory Opinion 18/03 of the IACtHR did not improve the situation of migrants in Mexico in 
the short-term (ibid., p. 303). 
95 For example, the ECtHR has consistently maintained the absolute nature of Article of 3 ECHR in expulsion 
cases (see e.g.: ECtHR (Judgment) 17 January 2012, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
8139/09, para. 185). 
96 )RUH[DPSOH'HPERXUVKRZVWKH(&W+5¶VUHYHUVDOFDXVHVIDPLOLHVWREHGLVORFDWHVsupra n. 60, p. 96-129). 
6KHSRLQWVRXWWKDWWKH&RXUW³>V@KDUHVWKH6WDWHV¶>I@HDURI>L@PPLJUDWLRQ´ibid., p. 115-117). 
97 See e.g.: N v United Kingdom, supra n. 85; and ECtHR (Judgment) 21 June 2011, Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, 
App. No. 5335/05. 
98 Da Lomba, supra n. 59, p. 9-10. 
99 For example, Western sWDWHV¶FRQWLQXLQJUHOLDQFHRQLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWZRUNIRUFHGRHVQRWVLWZHOOZLWKWKHVH
PLJUDQWV¶GHSLFWLRQDVQRQ-FRQWULEXWRUVDQGDQXQGXHEXUGHQ&'DXYHUJQH³6RYHUHLJQW\0LJUDWLRQDQGWKH
5XOH RI /DZ LQ *OREDO 7LPHV´  Modern Law Review (2004), p. 601). +RZHYHU ³because of their 
LPPLJUDWLRQVWDWXVLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVDUHFRXQWHGDVHYLGHQFHRIWKHLUWUDQVJUHVVLRQRILPPLJUDWLRQ
law requirements rather than being regarded as actual contributions´ (Da Lomba, supra n. 59, p. 8). 
  
For example, while the ECtHR depicts permanent regular migrants as contributors and 
consequently worthy recipients of national resources,100 irregular and short-term migrants are 
perceived as a burden.101 In contrast with the ECtHR, thH ,$&W+5¶V pro homine approach 
produces narratives that emphasize the vulnerability of many migrants and identifies the main 
causes of their predicament in receiving stateVLQFOXGLQJFXOWXUDOIDFWRUVWKDWµMXVWLI\¶KXPDQ
rights violations against them.102 The  construction of vulnerable groups in IHRL, however, is 
not without problems.103 &ULWLFDOO\LWLVSUREOHPDWLFLQWKDWLWDVVXPHVWKDWWKHµW\SLFDO¶,+5/
subject is invulnerable, which makes her an abstract subject detached from human reality. 
Below, I explain how, in contrast with a vulnerable group approach, a vulnerability analysis is 
founded on the concept of universal vulnerability. However, notwithstanding the risks 
DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI YXOQHUDEOH JURXSV WKH ,$&W+5¶V DSSURDFK FUHDWHV
QDUUDWLYHVWKDWDUHµIUHH¶IURPSROLF\FODLPV104 While Latin American stateV¶H[SHULHQFHVDV
migrant sending states support more positive outlooks on migrants and migration,105 it is the 
&RXUW¶V XQTXDOLILHG UHTXLUement that the exercise of the government immigration power is 
subject to IHRL that defines its narratives.  
Impediments to the transformation of regional human rights adjudicating bodies into 
GIMG actors further arise from barriers to PLJUDQWV¶DFFHVVWRKXPDQULJKWVDGMXGLFDWLRQ6RPH
of these barriers ± such as socio-economic and procedural barriers - DUHµVWDWXV-QHXWUDO¶DQGFDQ
                                                          
100 See e.g.: ECtHR (Judgment) 8 April 2014, Dhahbi v Italy, App. No. 17120/09, para. 84. 
101 Ibid.; and Ponomaryovi v Bulgaria, supra n. 102, para. 56. In the latter judgment, the Court stresses that 
irregular migrant children cannot be held responsible for their SDUHQWV¶XQODZIXOSUHVHQFHLQ the receiving State 
DQGWKHLU³laying claim to WKHXVHRILWVSXEOLFVHUYLFHV´ (ibid., para. 74). 
102 Nadege Dorzema et Al v Dominican Republic, supra n. 61, para. 153. 
103 The construction of vulnerable groups assumes cohesive groups and as such risks essentialising their 
PHPEHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVLWFDQSURYHH[FOXVLRQDU\WRZDUGVWKRVHZKRGRQRWSRVVHVVWKHUHTXLUHGJURXS
attributes; it comes with negative associations such as harm and suffering that commonly stereotype and 
stigmatise group members (Da Lomba, supra n. 76, p. 344). The vulnerable group approach is also problematic 
in that it supposes the existence of cohesive groups. Consequently, it can obscure significant differences 
between members while concealing similarities between members and the wider population (ibid., p. 343). This 
approach further undermines JURXSPHPEHUV¶LQGLYLGXDODJHQF\DQGULVNVEHLQJSDWHUQDOLVWLFibid., p. 344). On 
the problems associated with the construction of vulnerable groups in IHRL, see Da Lomba, ibid., p. 342-345. 
104 See e.g.: Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n. 61; Nadege Dorzema et Al v Dominican Republic, supra n. 
61; The Pacheco Tineo Family v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, supra n. 66; and Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, 
supra n. 61.  
105 Dembour, supra n. 60, p. 14-16. It is important to note that Latin American sWDWHV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIPLJUDWLRQ
can differ greatly and that migrants can face hardship in Latin American receiving states. 
  
be experienced LUUHVSHFWLYHRIRQH¶V legal status in the nation-state.106 Other barriers, however, 
are migrant-specific; they result from acute tensions between access to adjudication and 
immigration law enforcement. In Nadege Dorzema et Al v. Dominican Republic, the IACtHR 
REVHUYHVWKDWPLJUDQWV¶YXOQHUDbility stems, inter alia IURP³the legal and factual obstacles 
that make real access WRMXVWLFHLOOXVRU\´ for many of them.107 In order to resolve ± or at the 
very least ease - the tensions between access to adjudication and immigration law enforcement, 
CarHQV SURSRVHV WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D ³ILUHZDOO´ based on the prLQFLSOH WKDW ³no information 
gathered by those responsible for protecting and realizing basic human rights can be used for 
immigration enforcement purposes´108 Barriers to PLJUDQWV¶ DFFHVV WR DGMXGLFDWLRQ KDYH
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUUHJLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVERGLHV¶UROHDV*,0*DFWRUVI accept that the number 
of migrant cases and the range of migration-related human rights issues that reach adjudicating 
bodies are not commensurate with the extent of human rights violations faced by migrants 
DFURVV WKH ZRUOG ZKLFK LQHYLWDEO\ FRQVWUDLQV KXPDQ ULJKWV ERGLHV¶ FRQWULEXWLRQ WR *,0*
However, this does not negate the value of international human rights adjudication as a means 
to advance mLJUDQWV¶ KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG JRRG *,0* 7KHLU SURQRXQFHPHQWV KDYH HIIHFWV
EH\RQG LQGLYLGXDO FDVHV WKH\ FDQ SURPSW ODZ DQG SROLF\ UHIRUP VXSSRUW PLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWV
advocacy; draw attention to the human rights violations experienced by migrants and trigger 
informed debates; and shed light on international migration dynamics. 
Regional human rights adjudicating bodies have a key part to play in the development 
RIJRRG*,0*,QSDUWLFXODUWKH\FDQDGYDQFHPLJUDQWV¶ULJKWVSURWHFWLRQDQGSURYLGHYDOXDEOH
                                                          
106 For example, some human rights treaty systems do not provide for a right to individual petition, with the 
consequence that victims of human rights breaches must rely on other parties to bring their case to international 
human rights bodies. This is, for instance, the case of the European Social Charter and the ACHR systems. The 
former provides for a collective complaints procedure that allows certain organisations to raise questions 
concerning non-FRPSOLDQFHRID6WDWH¶VODZRUSUDFWLFHZLWK(XURSHDQ6RFLDO&KDUWHUSURYLVLRQVZLWKWKH(&65
cases before the IACtHR are started by an application presented either by the  Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights or by a State Party to the ACHR (respectively Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter 
Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 9 November 1995, C.E.T.S. No 158, entered into force 1 July 
1998); and Art. 61(1) ACHR). Persons may lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (Art. 44 ACHR).  
107 Nadege Dorzema et Al v. Dominican Republic, supra n. 61, para. 153. The more precarious the immigration 
status, the greater the obstacles to access to adjudication. Irregular migrants are often reluctant to pursue legal 
protections and remedies, even when their most basic human rights are at stake, for fear of coming to the 
DXWKRULWLHV¶DWWHQWLRQ(Da Lomba, supra n. 81, p. 50). 
108 -+&DUHQV³7KH5LJKWVRI,UUHJXODU0LJUDQWV´, 22(2) Ethics & International Affairs (2008), p. 167-618. 
  
insights into the realities of international migration. I accept that the transformation of these 
bodies into GIMG actors is not without challenges. However, the erosion of protection 
standards that FRPHVZLWK µFDYLQJ LQ¶ WR WKHJovernment immigration power presents much 
greater threats to human rights systems.  
4. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS AND A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 
TO GIMG 
Drawing on earlier work on the reconceptualisation of vulnerability as a foundation and tool 
of IHRL,109 I posit that the deployment of a vulnerability analysis in IHRL empowers regional 
human rights adjudicating bodies to become key GIMG actors.  
4.1. THE DEPLOYMENT OF A VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
+HUH , UHYLVLW )LQHPDQ¶V vulnerability theory with a view to theorising vulnerability as a 
foundation and tool of IHRL. 
4.1.1. )LQHPDQ¶V9XOQHUDELOLW\7heory 
)LQHPDQ¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ WKHRU\ FRQYLQFLQJO\ FRXQWHUV OLEHUDO WKHRU\ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI
vulnerability as an atypical and negative human trait.110 Her rebuttal of the liberal invulnerable 
subject is grounded in the realities of the human experience and rests on two critical 
observations: reliance on others and on institutions is inherent in the human experience;111 and 
YXOQHUDELOLW\³is experienced XQLTXHO\E\HDFK>LQGLYLGXDO@´112 It follows that vulnerability is 
both universal and particular.113 On this basis, Fineman persuasively theorises that the 
vulnerable subject must replace the liberal invulnerable subject.114  
In contrast with the liberal traditioQ )LQHPDQ¶V WKHVLV UHFRJQLVes the generative 
dimension of vulnerability.115 While Fineman accepts that vulnerability can result in 
³weakness, oU SK\VLFDO RU HPRWLRQDO GHFOLQH´,116 VKH VWUHVVHV WKDW ³vulnerability presents 
                                                          
109 Da Lomba, supra n. 76. 
110 0$)LQHPDQ³7KH9XOQHUDEOH6XEMHFW$QFKRULQJ(TXDOLW\LQWKH+XPDQ&RQGLWLRQ´Yale Journal 
of Law & Feminism (2008), p. 10-12. 
111 0$)LQHPDQµ(OGHUO\¶DV9XOQHUDEOH5HWKLQNLQJWKH1DWXUHRI,QGLYLGXDODQG6RFLHWDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\´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
The Elder Law Journal (2012), p. 88. 
112 Fineman, supra n. 110, p. 10.  
113 Ibid., p. 1.    
114 Ibid., p. 10-12.  
115 Fineman, supra n. 111, p. 96. 
116 Ibid. 
  
opportunities for innovation and growth, creativity, and fulfilment. It makes [individuals] reach 
out to others, form relatioQVKLSVDQGEXLOGLQVWLWXWLRQV´117 Fineman emphasises that ³people 
always possess sources of resilience in the IDFHRIWKHLUYXOQHUDELOLWLHV´118 Thus, the vulnerable 
VXEMHFWLVQRWUHGXFHGWRDµKHOSOHVVYLFWLP¶RIKHr vulnerability. Having recognised that human 
YXOQHUDELOLW\LVLQWULQVLFLQWKHKXPDQFRQGLWLRQ)LQHPDQ¶VWKHRU\LVFRQFHUQHGZLWKEXLOGLQJ
WKH YXOQHUDEOH VXEMHFW¶V UHVLOLHQFH 6Lgnificantly, VKH VWUHVVHV WKDW ³the counterpoint to 
vulnerability is not invulnerability, for that is impossible to achieve, but rather the resilience 
that comes from having some means with which to aGGUHVV DQG FRQIURQW PLVIRUWXQH´119  
&HQWUDOWR)LQHPDQ¶Vtheory is the REVHUYDWLRQWKDW³it is through institutions that [individuals] 
gain access to resources with which to confront, ameliorate, satisfy, and address [their] 
vulnerability´120 ,PSRUWDQWO\WKHYXOQHUDEOHVXEMHFW¶VUHOLDQFHRQLQVWLWXWLRQDODVVHWVSODFHVD
duty on the state to respond to vulnerability. The responsive state calls for a redefinition of the 
relationship between the individual, the state DQGLWVLQVWLWXWLRQVWRVHFXUHLQGLYLGXDOV¶DFFHVV
to the institutional resources they need to become more resilient. The extent of the sWDWH¶V duty 
YDULHVZLWKLQGLYLGXDOV¶³location within webs of social, economic, political, and institutional 
relationships that strucWXUH RSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG RSWLRQV´121 Importantly, reliance on the 
responsive state GRHVQRWQHJDWHWKHYXOQHUDEOHVXEMHFW¶VRZQUHVLOLHQFHDQGDJHQF\,QGHHG
)LQHPDQ¶V vulnerability analysis recognises the generative dimension of human vulnerability 
DQGWKHYXOQHUDEOHVXEMHFW¶VLQQDWHUHVLOLHQFH0RUHRYHU)LQHPDQDFFHSWVWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVDUH
themselves vulnerable, which constrains the sWDWH¶V response to human vulnerability.122  
)LQHPDQ¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ WKHRU\ VXFFHVVIXOO\ HVFKHZV WKH OLEHUDO LQvulnerable subject. 
However, for this subject to provide a fitting model for the construction of the IHRL subject, 
she must be status-neutral. Above, I note how the nationalistic nature of the IHRL subject 
PDNHV PLJUDQWV¶ LQFOXVLRQ LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPan rights regime contingent on their 
immigration status. Critically, in the same way as the universal premise of IHRL is set against 
the exercise of government immigration power, the duty that universal vulnerability places on 
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118 /3HURQLDQG$7LPPHU³9XOQHUDEOH*URXSV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5LJKWV&RQYHQWLRQ/DZ´International Journal of Constitutional Law (2013), p. 1074, referring to Fineman, 
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119 )LQHPDQ³7KH9XOQHUDEOH6XEMHFWDQGWKH5HVSRQVLYH6WDWH´Emory Law journal (2010-2011), p. 269. 
120 Fineman, supra n. 111, p. 98. 
121 Ibid., p. 99. 
122 Fineman, supra n. 110, p. 12. 
  
the state is located within the bounded nation-state. Fineman does not explore the issue of 
citizenship. She intimates that the sWDWH¶V GXW\LVRZHGWR³citizens and others to whom [the 
state@RZHVVRPHREOLJDWLRQ´123 and suggests that WKHVHµRWKHUV¶VKRXOGLQFOXGH³non-citizens 
who are resident, long-term visitors, or those who have some other connection with the State 
which makes the state responsible for them´124 &RQVHTXHQWO\ PLJUDQWV¶ LQFOXVLRQ LQ WKH
redistribution of resilience-building assets is contingent on the sWDWH¶V construction of national 
PHPEHUVKLS,WIROORZVWKDWWKHYXOQHUDEOHVXEMHFWVKDUHVWKH,+/5VXEMHFW¶VQDWLRQDOLVWLFWUDLW
WKXVDVLWVWDQGV)LQHPDQ¶VWKHRU\FDQQRWPDNH,+5/PRUHUHVSRQVLYHWRPLJUDQWV¶SURWHFWLRQ
needs, especially migrants with a precarious immigration status. However, this is not to say 
WKDW)LQHPDQ¶VYXOQHUDELOLW\WKHRU\FDQQRWEHLQVWUXPHQWDOLQILOOLQJSURWHFWLRQJDSVLQ,+5/
On the contrary, I contend that there is great merit in her theory provided that its paradoxical 
duality is remedied. In this respect, I posit that the theorisation of vulnerability as a foundation 
and tool of IHRL must be underpinned by an universalistic idea of citizenship.  
4.1.2. Reclaiming Vulnerability as a Foundation and Tool of IHRL 
The reconceptualisation of vulnerability as a foundation and tool of IHRL seeks to make IHRL 
responsive to the vulnerabilities of the IHRL subject and, in so doing, fill the protection gaps 
in IHRL. The concept of vulnerability is not alien to IHRL; IHRL confers specific protection 
on groups deemed vulnerable. One could (unconvincingly) argue that the vulnerable group 
approach does not conceptually differ from a vulnerability analysis in that both rest on the 
notion of universal vulnerability, the former approach implicitly recognisLQJWKDWWKHµW\SLFDO¶
,+5/VXEMHFWLVµOHVVYXOQHUDEOH¶WKDQPHPEHUVRIYXOQHUDEOHJURXSV125 This understanding of 
the vulnerable group approach yields two further assumptions: IHRL is capable of responding 
to universal vulnerability; DQGWKH³SOXUDOL]DWLRQ´ of IHRL126 is congruent with its universal 
premise.127 These three assumptions, however, can be challenged. Contrary to what its 
advocates assert, the vulnerable group approach does not eschew the liberal invulnerable 
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124 Ibid.  
125 This view is, for example, held by an ECtHR judge (Peroni and Timmer, supra n. 118, p 1060-1061. 
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Human Rights Quarterly (2008), p. 495. 
127 Ibid.  
  
subject.128 Rather it seeks to mitigate the exclusionary dimension of IHRL by providing 
SURWHFWLRQ WR WKH µDW\SLFDO¶ YXOQHUDEOH ,+5/ VXEMHFW ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV UDWKHU WKDQ SURYLGH
evidence of the ability of IHRL to respond to universal vulnerability in all its diversity, 
³population-specific instruments are manifestations of the failures of IHRL to protect the most 
YXOQHUDEOH´129  
The deployment of a vulnerability analysis first begs the question of the recognition of 
vulnerability as the common basis of human rights. The rationale for the conceptualisation of 
vulnerability as a foundation of IHRL lies with its univerVDOLW\7XUQHUSRLQWVRXWWKDW³[t]he 
idea of vulnerable humanity recognises the obviously corporeal dimension of existence; it 
describes the condition of sentient, embodied creatures who are open to the dangers of their 
environment and are conscious of WKHLU SUHFDULRXV FLUFXPVWDQFHV´130 Universality alone, 
however, cannot make vulnerability a common basis of IHRL; vulnerability must be shown to 
be relevant to all human rights. Criticism has been levelled at the proposed thesis on the ground 
that vulnerability is essentially relevant to social and economic rights.131 The assumption here 
is that responses to vulnerability are primarily found in the realisation of this category of rights. 
This argument, however, rests on a truncated understanding of lived vulnerability and a rigid 
categorisation of human rights. Vulnerability cannot be reduced to a socio-economic issue; it 
is a multifaceted human phenomenon that has multiple and diverse causes132 and as such maps 
on extremely well to a human rights framework. IHRL responses to this complex human 
predicament must be wide-ranging and encompass the realisation of all human rights. 
Moreover, in addition to misrepresenting vulnerability, the emphasis on social and economic 
rights overlooks the indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of human rights.133 
Critically, it ignores both the role of civil and political rights in the enjoyment of social and 
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129 Da Lomba, supra n. 76, p. 345.  
130 B. S. Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Presses, 
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life and her access to justice. 
133 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, para. 
5. 
  
economic rights134 and the relevance of civil and political rights to protection in the socio-
economic sphere.135 ,W IROORZV WKDW YXOQHUDELOLW\ ³RIIHUV D>Q@« DOO-embracing theoretical 
foundation for human rights´136 Importantly, and in contrast with Turner,137 I posit that the 
theorisation of vulnerability as a foundation of IHRL must recognise the generative nature of 
vulnerability, so that individual agency is acknowledged in both the construction of the IHRL 
subject and the articulation of the duty of IHRL to respond to vulnerability.  
Up to this point, my reconceptualisation of vulnerability as a common basis of human 
ULJKWVFORVHO\IROORZV)LQHPDQ¶VWKHRU\+RZHYHULIDYXOQHUDELOLW\DQDO\VLVLVWRVXFFHHGLQ
filling protection gaps in IHRL, the vulnerable subject must lose her nationalistic dimension. 
With this in mind, I posit that the theorisation of vulnerability as a foundation of IHRL must 
rest on an universalistic understanding of citizenship based on personhood. The aim here is to 
reconcile the construction of the IHRL subject with the universal premise of IHRL. Below, I 
show how this reconceptualisation is critical to the recognition of migrants as fully-fledged 
IHRL subjects. 
With the affirmation of the vulnerable subject, IHRL becomes concerned with building 
resilience. This redefinition of the aim of IHRL entrusts regional and, more broadly, 
international human rights bodies with a dual function; making IHRL responsive to human 
vulnerability requires that these bodies recognise and then respond to lived vulnerability. This 
IXQFWLRQ ILUVW SURPSWV DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR WKH ,+5/ VXEMHFW¶V VRFLHWDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
relationships accompanied by an inquiry into state policy choices. The former undertaking 
UHTXLUHV WKDWKXPDQULJKWVERGLHVH[DPLQHKRZ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ VRFLDO HFRQRPic, political and 
institutional interactions shape their vulnerabilities. This investigation triggers an inquiry into 
the role of the state in the construction and perpetuation of disadvantage, which in turn brings 
about an inquiry into state policy decisions. The latter raises the question of the standard of 
review.  In this respect, I contend that a vulnerability analysis demands that regional human 
rights adjudicating bodies fully scrutinise stateV¶SROLF\GHFLVLRQVLQ WKHOLJKWRI WKHLU ,+5/
obligations.  
Objections have been levelled at the use of a substantive standard of review, especially 
in relation to stateV¶ UHVRXUFH DOORFDWLRQ GHFLVLRQV DQG VRFLDO SROLF\ FKRLFHV 7KH SULPDU\
                                                          
134 Turner, supra n. 130, p. 37. 
135 See e.g.: ECtHR (Judgment) 9 October 1979, Airey v Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, para. 26. 
136 Grear, supra n. 74, p. 135. 
137 Turner, supra n. 130, p. 26.  
  
objection rests on the notion that in-depth scrutiny amounts to decision-making and, for this 
reason, constitutes an illegitimate encroachment on the executive and legislative power.138 The 
legitimacy objection is also linked to the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine. According to the former, the role of international human rights 
adjudicating bodies is subsidiary to that of the state. On this basis, the ECtHR has developed 
the margin of DSSUHFLDWLRQ GRFWULQH ³to avoid trespassing on a 6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQW\´139 
,PSRUWDQWO\³the wider the margin, the OHVVVWULFWWKHVFUXWLQ\´ of stateV¶SROLF\FKRLFHV140 The 
width of the margin of appreciation varies with the issue under consideration. For example, the 
ECtHR has repeatedly granted states a wide margin of appreciation in the economic and social 
spheres.141 Similarly, the notion that immigration control is an intrinsic state prerogative has 
led the Court to give states a wide margin of appreciation in migration matters; its width, 
however, varies with the ECHR rights being considered.142 There is no space to critique the 
margin of appreciation doctrine. However, it is important to note that, because it entails a 
substantive standard of review, the deployment of a vulnerability analysis significantly reduces 
the margin of appreciation bestowed on states. In-depth scrutiny further exposes a vulnerability 
analysis to objections based on expertise. The thrust of this objection is that international 
human rights adjudicating bodies lack the necessary knowledge to deal with matters pertaining 
                                                          
138  The legitimacy objection has been raised in the context of social rights adjudication (see e.g.: M. Langford, 
³7KH-XVWLFLDELOLW\RI6RFLDO5LJKWV)URP3UDFWLFHWR7KHRU\´LQ0/DQJIRUGHGSocial Rights Jurisprudence, 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (New York, Cambridge University Press 2008), p. 3, 34. 
139 05+XWFKLQVRQ³7KH0DUJLQRI$SSUHFLDWLRQ'RFWULQHDQGWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1999), p. 640. 
140 D. McGoldriFN³$'HIHQFHRIWKH0DUJLQRI$SSUHFLDWLRQDQGDQ$UJXPHQWIRULWV$SSOLFDWLRQE\WKH
+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLWWHH´International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016), p. 26. 
141 E.g.: Dhahbi v Italy, supra n. 100, para. 46. The ECtHR has stressed that sWDWHV¶PDUJLQRIDSSUHFLDWLRQLV
SDUWLFXODUO\ ZLGH LQ UHVSHFW RI ³LVVXHV LQYROY>LQJ@ DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI >QDWLRQDO@ SULRULWLHV LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH
DOORFDWLRQRIOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHV´(&W+5'HFLVLRQ-DQXDU\Pentiacova and Others v Moldova, App. No. 
14462/03). 
142 )RUH[DPSOHWKH(&W+5³has recognised a particularly wide margin of discretion for states in respect of 
$UWLFOHI´  (H. Lambert, The Position of Aliens in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2007), p. 32, <www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-
EN-HRFILES-08(2007).pdf>. 
  
to policy and decision-making,143 especially in relation to polycentric issues.144 However, both 
the legitimacy and expertise objections lack teeth and do not sit well with stateV¶DFFHSWDQFHRI
IHRL obligations and their submission to the jurisdiction of human rights bodies.145 
Significantly, the legitimacy objection is premised on the ill-conceived notion that substantive 
review of stateV¶SROLF\FKRLFHVDPRXQWV WRSROLF\DQGGHFLVLRQ-making. Yet the aim of in-
depth scrutiny is not to reformulate state policies; rather it is to ascertain whether stateV¶SROLF\
decisions are consistent with their IHRL obligations.146  Thus, rather than undermine 
legitimacy, substantive UHYLHZ KHOSV SURPRWH µD FXOWXUH RI MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ LQ SRlicy-making, 
thereby fostering government legitimacy and accountability. The same argument can be made 
in support of a narrow margin of appreciation. Importantly, not all international human rights 
bodies embrace this doctrine. For example, the Human Rights Committee under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights has rejected this doctrine.147 By contrast 
with its European counterpart, the IACtHR has proved sceptical towards the margin of 
DSSUHFLDWLRQ GRFWULQH &DQGLD DWWULEXWHV WKH &RXUW¶V FDXWLRXV DSSURDFK WR WKHKLVWRULFDO and 
SROLWLFDOFRQWH[WLQZKLFKLWKDVGHYHORSHGDQGWRWKH&RXUW¶VDVSLUDWLRQWREHFRPHa quasi-
constitutional court entrusted with standardising national legislation.148  Substantive review, 
                                                          
143 6HHHJ0:HVVRQ³(TXDOLW\DQG6RFLDO5LJKWV$Q([SORUDWLRQLQ/LJKWRIWKH6RXWK$IULFDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQ´
Winter Public Law (2007), p. 761.  
144 6HH/)XOOHU³7KH)RUPVDQG/LPLWVRI$GMXGLFDWLRQ´Harvard Law Review (1978-1979), p. 353, discussed 
iQ-.LQJ³7KH3HUYDVLYHQHVVRI3RO\FHQWULFLW\´Spring Public Law (2008), p. 101. 
145 Langford, supra n. 138, p. 34. 
146 For example, WKH (&65 KDV HPSKDVLVHG ³WKDW LW LV QRW WKH WDVN RI WKH &RPPLWWHH WR VXEVWLWXWH LWVHOI LQ
determining the policy best adapteGWRWKHVLWXDWLRQ´(&65'HFLVLRQRQWKH0HULWV2FWREHUEuropean 
Roma Centre v. Bulgaria, Collective Complaint No 31/2005, para. 37). 7KH(&65¶VUROHLVFRQILQHGWRDVVHVVLQJ
whether sWDWHV¶ VRFLDOSROLF\GHFLVLRQVDUHFRQJUXHQWZLWK WKHLU(XURSHDQ6RFLDO&KDUWHUREOLJDWLRQVVHHHJ
ECSR (Decision on Merits) 29 September 2003, Autism-Europe v. France, Collective Complaint No. 13/2002, 
para. 53). In Autism-Europe v. France, the ECSR rHMHFWHGWKHFRPSODLQDQWRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWIXQGLQJ
for the education of autistic children and adults should come from the education budget, which would have 
amounted to ring fencing funding (ibid., para. 54). 
147 See e.g.: HRC (View) 26 October 1994, Länsman et al v Finland, Cmm No 511/1992, para. 9.4. 
148 G. &DQGLD³&RPSDULQJ'LYHUVH$SSURDFKHVWRWKH0DUJLQRI$SSUHFLDWLRQ7KH&DVHRIWKH(XURSHDQDQG
the Inter-$PHULFDQ&RXUWVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´0DUFKS
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2406705>. Candia notes that, in contrast with the IACtHR, the 
(&W+5VHHVLWVHOIDVD³supranational [courW@ZLWKVXEVLGLDU\MXULVGLFWLRQ´ (ibid.). For example, the ECtHR 
emphasises the subsidiary nature of the Strasbourg complaint machinery in Paposhvili v. Belgium (supra n. 82, 
para. 184). Candia descULEHVWKH,$&W+5¶VDSSURDFKDV³PRUHLQWUXVLYH´ and recommends that the Court makes 
  
however, does not seek to standardise national legislation; its aim is to ensure that states fully 
comply with their IHRL obligations. Moreover, while in-depth scrutiny seeks to uphold 
fundamental human rights standards, it does not preclude international human rights 
adjudicating bodies from accounting for stateV¶VSHFific contexts in their human rights breach 
DVVHVVPHQWV$VLVWKHFDVHZLWKWKHOHJLWLPDF\REMHFWLRQFRQFHUQVRYHUKXPDQULJKWVERGLHV¶
lack of expertise rests on the flawed assumption that in-depth scrutiny equates with policy and 
decision-making.149 Furthermore, this objection overlooks the fact that these bodies can receive 
training and resort WRH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQV when they lack the necessary technical knowledge.150 
The deployment of a vulnerability analysis entrusts regional human rights adjudicating 
bodies with the task of recognising but also responding to lived vulnerability, which can only 
be positive if the promise of human rights is to be realised. Critically, IHRL obligations become 
UHVRXUFHVWRKHOSEXLOGWKH,+5/VXEMHFW¶VUHVLOLHQFH,WIROORZVWKDWWKHVHERGLHVPXVWUHGHILQH
themselves as asset-conferring institutions. This, in turn, compels them to revisit their approach 
to human rights adjudication. Notably, making IHRL responsive to vulnerability requires an 
activist approach to the articulation of positive obligations. For example, the deployment of a 
vulnerability analysis would require that the ECtHR more readily identifies positive obligations 
in the socio-economic domain.151 The transformation of IHRL obligations into resilience-
building assets further demands that states mobilise the resources necessary to the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHLUREOLJDWLRQV+HUHDYXOQHUDELOLW\DQDO\VLVFDQERUURZIURPWKH(&65¶s 
approach; the Committee has held that compliance with the European Social Charter requires 
that Contracting 3DUWLHV PHHW WKHLU REOLJDWLRQV ³within a reasonable time, with measurable 
progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available rHVRXUFHV´152  
                                                          
greater use of the margin of appreciation doctrine to comply with the principle of subsidiarity and avoid 
encroaching on State sovereignty (supra n. 148). 
149 Langford, supra n. 138, p. 35. 
150 90DQWRXYDORX³,Q6XSSRUWRI/HJDOLVDWLRQ´ LQ&. Gearty and V. Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 85, 118.  
151 Da Lomba, supra n. 81, p. 39.  
152 See e.g.: Autism-Europe v France, supra n. 146SDUD7KH(&65¶VDSSURDFKLVUHPLQLVFHQWRIWKHDSSURDFK
enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Article 2 of the Covenant 
requires that States realise the rights guaranteed in the Covenant to the maximum of their available resources 
(International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966). 
  
[W]here the implementation of the rights proves highly complex and costly, the States Parties 
must endeavour to achieve the aims of the Charter according to a reasonable timetable, 
securing measurable progress and making optimum use of such resources as can be 
mustered.[153]  
A vulnerability analysis requires that WKHFRQFHSWRI³PD[LPXPDYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV´ be given 
a broad understanding so that it encompasses all state resources.154 For example, assessing 
whether a state has fully discharged its IHRL obligations must account for its (lack of) 
investment in basic infrastructure.155 Importantly, arguments based on resource shortages 
cannot be allowed to erode stateV¶REOLJDWLRQV,QWKLVUHVSHFWLWLVZHOO-established that resort 
to the concept of maximum available resources does not prevent the identification of both 
immediate and core IHRL obligations.156 Furthermore, while the use of the concept of 
maximum available resources is commonly associated with the implementation of social and 
economic rights, a vulnerability analysis makes it relevant to all human rights.  
4.2. VULNERABILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF REGIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ADJUDICATING BODIES INTO GIMG ACTORS 
Here I show how the deployment of a vulnerability analysis in international human rights 
adjudication empowers regional human rights adjudicating bodies to make a meaningful 
contribution to good GIMG by providing a strong human rights underpinning and supporting 
a novel approach to human rights adjudication.  
4.2.1. An Entrenched Human Rights Underpinning 
Human rights are central to good GIMG. Thus, the transformation of regional human rights 
adjudicating bodies into key governance actors is first and foremost contingent on adjudication 
having a strong human rights underpinning. While this could be regarded as a given, reversals 
reveal that human rights can come second to the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration.  
                                                          
153 Defence for Children International (DCI) v. Belgium, supra n. 90, para. 71. 
154 See ComESCR, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, An Evaluation of the Obligation to 
7DNH 6WHSV WR WKH µ0D[LPXP RI $YDLODEOH 5HVRXUFHV¶ under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, UN Doc 
(&  DQG ' (OVRQ 5 %DODNULVKQDQ DQG - +HLQW] ³3XEOLF )LQDQFH 0D[LPXP $YDLODEOH
5HVRXUFHV DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV´ LQ $ 1RODQ 5 2¶&RQQHOO DQG & +DUYH\ HGV Human Rights and Public 
Finance, Budgets & the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013), p. 13. 
155 Ibid., p. 22. 
156 See e.g.: CESCR (General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health) 11 
August 2000, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4. 
  
The affirmation of the vulnerable subject supports the recognition of migrants as fully-
IOHGJHG ,+5/ VXEMHFWV LUUHVSHFWLYH RI WKHLU LPPLJUDWLRQ VWDWXV 7KLV µOHJDO VWDWXV-QHXWUDO¶
subject compels regional human rights adjudicating bodies to firmly put human rights before 
the government immigration power. AERYH,VWUHVVWKDWWKH,$&W+5¶Vpro homine approach 
satisfies this requirement, thereby begging the question of the differences between a 
µWUDGLWLRQDO¶pro homine approach and a vulnerability analysis and their respective merits.  Both 
approaches put human rights first and as such share a strong human rights underpinning.  The 
,$&W+5¶V DSSURDFK \LHOGV MXGLFLDO SURQRXQFHPHQWV WKDW Dre premised on the notion that 
³attrLEXWHVRIWKHKXPDQSHUVRQDOLW\´ calls for international protection.157 One such attribute is 
vulnerability; however, this concept is employed in the context of a vulnerable group approach. 
For example, the IACtHR has emphasisHGXQGRFXPHQWHGDGXOWPLJUDQWV¶YXOQHUDELOLW\158 and 
XQGRFXPHQWHGPLJUDQWFKLOGUHQ¶VVSHFLDOYXOQHUDELlity.159 Vulnerability is not construed as the 
basis of human rights;  it is human dignity that is the foundation of  human rights in the 
,$&W+5¶VFDVHODZ160 There is no space to discuss the concept of human dignity in IHRL161 
and my contribution is confined to comparing the merits of human dignity and vulnerability in 
ensuring that human rights are entrenched in international human rights adjudication.  In this 
UHVSHFW WKH(&W+5DQG(&65¶V UHYHUVDOVGemonstrate that the conceptualisation of human 
dignity as the basis of IHRL does not necessarily guarantee a pro homine approach; the sWDWH¶V 
ULJKWWRFRQWUROLPPLJUDWLRQUHPDLQVWKHVHERGLHV¶VWDUWLQJSRLQWLQPLJUDQWFDVHV. This is not 
to say that dignity has no place in IHRL; both dignity and vulnerability are attributes of the 
human and as such are interrelated. Rather, I posit that making IHRL responsive to universal 
vulnerability protects and promotes human dignity. In other words, the concept of vulnerability 
becomes instrumental in guaranteeing respect for human dignity. A vulnerability analysis is 
DOVR GLVWLQFWLYH LQ WKDW LW WULJJHUV DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR PLJUDQWV¶ VRFLHWDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
interactions as well as in-depth scrutiny of the exercise of the government immigration power. 
                                                          
157 ACHR, Preamble, supra n. 61. 
158 Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n.61, para. 71; Nadege Dorzema et Al v Dominican Republic, supra n. 
61, para. 152; and The Pacheco Tineo Family v Plurinational State of Bolivia, supra n. 61, para. 128. 
159 Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n. 61, para. 66. 
160 See e.g.: The Pacheco Tineo Family v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, supra n. 61, para. 129; and IACtHR 
(Judgment) 26 June 2012, Díaz Peña v. Venezuela, para. 135. 
161 &0F&UXGGHQ³+XPDQ'LJQLW\DQG-XGLFLDO,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´European Journal of 
International Law (2008), p. 655. 
  
These features have the merit to flesh out the concept of vulnerability, thereby making it a more 
tangible concept than human dignity.  
I accept that the reconceptualisation of vulnerability as a foundation of IHRL cannot 
totally disable the government immigration power. However, what it can do is contain its 
LQIOXHQFH7KLVFDQEHVKRZQLQUHVSHFWRIWKHWZRPDLQDVSHFWVRIWKLVSRZHU¶VLQIOXHQFHRQ
IHRL. First, a vulnerability analysis cannot prevent the government immigration power from 
affecting the creation of IHRL, especially the personal scope of international human rights 
instruments and the range of rights they guarantee. However, because it provides human rights 
adjudicating bodies with a potent interpretative tool, a vulnerability analysis can bring migrants 
from the margins to the core of the international human rights regime. Arguably, vulnerability-
sensitive interpretations of IHRL could be seen to flout the sWDWH¶V consent. However, as noted 
above, these legitimacy-related concerns are overstated. Besides, they unduly stifle human 
ULJKWVLQVWUXPHQWV¶DGDSWDELOLW\WRVRFLHWDOFKDQJHVDQGHYROYLQJSURWHFWLRQQHHGV162  Above, 
I further stress that timid interpretations imperil human rights systems. The second aspect of 
the gRYHUQPHQWLPPLJUDWLRQSRZHU¶VUHVLOLHQFHOLes in the inability of a vulnerability basis to 
fully guarantee equality between migrants and (national) citizens. A vulnerability analysis does 
not obviate the sWDWH¶V ULJKW WR UHJXODWH PLJUDQWV¶ HQWU\ UHVLGHQFH DQG H[LW ZLWK WKH
consequence that differHQWLDO WUHDWPHQWRQDFFRXQWRIRQH¶V LPPLJUDWLRQVWDWXVPD\SHUVLVW
What a vulnerability analysis does, however, is subject the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration 
to IHRL.  Consequently, differential treatment cannot result in an erosion of human rights 
standards for migrants as this would frustrate their recognition as fully-fledged IHRL subjects. 
This does not constitute a novel understanding of the principle of equality. The ACtHR has 
affirmed the jus cogens nature of the principle of equality before the law163 DQGKHOGWKDW³the 
migratory status of a person [could] not constitute a justification to deprive him of the 
enjoymenW DQG H[HUFLVH RI KXPDQ ULJKWV´164 However, not all regional human rights 
adjudicating bodies construct equality in a manner that is consistent with the recognition of 
migrants as fully-fledged IHRL subjects. While the ECtHR has repeatedly held that differential 
treatment exclusively EDVHGRQQDWLRQDOLW\UHTXLUHV³YHU\ZHLJKW\UHDVRQV´,165 it does not apply 
                                                          
162 The ECtHR has repeDWHGO\GHVFULEHGWKH(&+5DVD³OLYLQJLQVWUXPHQW´ (see e.g.: ECtHR (Judgment) 25 
April 1978, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, para. 31). 
163 Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n.61, Part IV (especially para. 88). 
164 Ibid., paras. 169, 8. 
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this high threshold to differHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWRQDFFRXQWRIRQH¶VLPPLJUDWLRQVWDWXVZKHUHWKHUH
is an element of choice in the immigration status.166 7KH(&W+5¶VUHDVRQLQJLVSUREOHPDWLFRQ
two accounts: first, immigration status becomes a primary determinant of the extent of human 
rights protection; secondly, its rests on a simplistic - or at the very least under-researched - 
understanding of the concept of choice in the context of migratory decisions. This concept 
tends to be closely associated with the notion of voluntary migration; whether migration is 
SHUFHLYHG DV YROXQWDU\ RU LQYROXQWDU\ KDV VLJQLILFDQW LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU PLJUDQWV¶ ULJKWV DQG
duties in receiving states. OttoQHOOLDQG7RUUHVLREVHUYHWKDW³[t]hose who want to downplay 
the duties toward migrants tend to picture voluntary migration as a matter of mere 
preference´167 7KH (&W+5¶V DSSURDFK LQ PLJUDQW FDVHV VKRZV KRZ WKH FRQFHSW RI
voluntariness can play an important role in human rights breach assessments. For example, the 
&RXUW¶VUHYHUVDOVXSSRUWVWKHLGHDWKDWLUUHJXODUPLgration and the breaches of immigration laws 
that it entails constitute voluntary acts for which (adult) migrants should be held 
µUHVSRQVLEOH¶168 &RQVHTXHQWO\ LUUHJXODU PLJUDQWV¶ µFKRLFH¶ WR PLJUDWH illegally weighs 
XQIDYRXUDEO\ RQ WKH &RXUW¶V DVVHVVPHQWV169 Yet the concept of voluntariness requires a 
nuanced and sophisticated conceptualisation. In this regard, Ottonelli and Torresi propose a 
conceptualisation of voluntary migration that has the merit of recognisLQJPLJUDQWV¶DJHQF\
while avoiding to reduce migratory decisions to mere choices.170 
                                                          
166 ECtHR (Judgment) 27 September 2011, Bah v. United Kingdom, App. No. 56328/07, para. 47. 
167 92WWRQHOOLDQG77RUUHVL³:KHQLV0LJUDWLRQ9ROXQWDU\"´International Migration Review (2013), 
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contrary to the law (ECtHR (Decision) 8 September 2015, Jean-Michel Okitaloshima Okonda Osungu and Anita 
Okitaloshima Okonda Osungu v. France and Elisabeth Selpa Lokongo v. France, Apps.Nos 76860/11 
and 51354/13, para. 45). 
170 Voluntary migration must be non-coerced; migrants must come from a position of sufficiency; they must 
have exit options; and they must have knowledge of the migratory path that they are choosing (Ottonelli and 
Torresi, supra n. 167, p. 168). 
  
The strong human rights underpinning that comes with the reconceptualisation of 
vulnerability as a foundation of IHRL enables human rights adjudicating bodies to partake in 
the development of good GIMG. The affirmation of the vulnerable subject and the ensuing 
recognition of migrants as fully-fledged IHRL subjects bolster a principled approach to 
migration governance. Moreover, the construction of the IHRL subject in keeping with the 
universal premise of IHRL brings coherence to both IHRL and GIMG. Besides, because it is 
grounded in the realities and complexities of international migration - thereby avoiding the 
pitfalls associated with policy-driven and legalistic categorisations of migrants and migration 
-, the affirmation of the vulnerable subject supports coherent, viable and sustainable 
governance.   
4.2.2. A Novel Approach to International Human Rights Adjudication in Migrant Cases 
Here, I examine how the theorisation of vulnerability as a tool of IHRL transforms international 
human rights adjudication in migrant cases and equips regional human rights adjudicating 
bodies with the means to participate in the development of good GIMG. The deployment of a 
vulnerability analysis brings about two fundamental changes to human rights adjudication: it 
SURPSWVDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWRPLJUDQWV¶VRFLHWDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGLWDGRSWVD
substantive standard of review of stateV¶PLJUDWLRQSROLF\FKRLFHV%RWKFKDQJHVHQDEOHKXPDQ
rights bodies to identify and respond to miJUDQWV¶YXOQHUDELOLWLHVDQGLQVRGRLQJVXSSRUWWKHLU
role as GIMG actors. 
4.2.2.1. Identifying 0LJUDQWV¶9XOQHUDELOLW\ 
5HJLRQDO KXPDQ ULJKWV DGMXGLFDWLQJ ERGLHV¶ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR PLJUDQWV¶ VRFLHWDO DQG
institutional relationships is concerned with identifying lived vulnerability with a view to 
providing migrants with the resilience-building assets they need. Thus, this investigation 
provides the basis for determining stateV¶ ,+5/REOLJDWLRQVWRZDUGVPLJUDQWV7KH,$&W+5
with its pro homine approach has come the closest to undertaking an investigation into 
PLJUDQWV¶ LQWHUDFWLRQV171 Conversely, reversals rely on stateV¶ DFFRXQWV RI PLJUDQWV¶
relationships. Troublingly, these accounts are informed by the assumptions that underpin 
immigration laws, policies and discourse.172  Of particular significance in the construction of 
                                                          
171 In Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, VWDWHV¶SUDFWLFHVLQUHVSHFWRILUUHJXODUPLJUDWLRQDQGLUUHJXODUPLJUDQWVEHDU
RQWKH,$&W+5¶VDVVHVVPHQWV(Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n. 61, paras. 169-170). 
172 Common assumptions include the idea that welfare provision for migrants acts as a pull factor; that irregular 
migration is a simple matter of preference; that migrants with a precarious immigration status are a burden on 
national resources; and that irregular migrants do not contribute to the national community. 
  
WKHVH QDUUDWLYHV DUH WKH DVVXPSWLRQV WKDW FRPHZLWK RQH¶V LPPLJUDWLRQ VWDWXV ,PPLJUDWLRQ
statuses assume varying degrees of remoteness from the state that, in turn, create assumptions 
UHJDUGLQJPLJUDQWV¶ UHODWLRQVKLSV$FFRUGLQJO\PLJUDQWVZLWKDSUHFDULRXV VWDWXVDUH LQ WKH
main located outside the national community, with the consequence that their interests are 
commonly set against those of the receiving state. Critically, these assumptions provide an 
XQUHOLDEOHSLFWXUHRIPLJUDQWV¶VRFLHWDODQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUDFWLRQVWKDWZHLJKRQKXPDQULJKWV
breach assessments. Conversely, a vulnerability analysis is concerned with understanding the 
QDWXUHRIPLJUDQWV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVZLth the state, its community and its institutions. Consequently, 
a vulnerability analysis makes for narratives and IHRL breach assessments that have a solid 
knowledgebase. Importantly, the light that international human rights adjudication then sheds 
on migUDQWV¶ H[SHULHQFHV DQG WKH G\QDPLFV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO PLJUDWLRQ DGYDQFHV WKH
development of the comprehensive knowledgebase integral to good GIMG. 
Whether regional human rights adjudicating bodies can contribute to building the 
knowledgebase necessary to both good international human rights adjudication and good 
GIMG is contingent on their being capable of undertaking the requisite investigation into 
PLJUDQWV¶LQWHUDFWLRQV+XPDQULJKWVERGLHVFDQQRWEHH[SHFWHGWRKDYHVSHFLDOLVWNQRZOHGJH
in all matters of international migration. The absence of in-built expertise, however, does not 
constitute an unsurmountable obstacle; their lack of knowledge can be filled using a range of 
methods and sources. First, judges and other members of human rights bodies can be trained.173 
6HFRQGO\JUHDWHUZHLJKWVKRXOGEHJLYHQWRPLJUDQWV¶YRLFHVLQWKHDGMXGLFDWLRQSURFHVV7KH
information provided by applicants and the questions put to them should help gain a thorough 
understanding of their experiences as migrants and should not therefore be confined to those 
issues directly arising from the alleged human rights violations. Thirdly, respondent states have 
DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH WRSOD\ LQEXLOGLQJDSLFWXUHRIPLJUDQWV¶ UHODWLRQVKLSV$VVKRZQEHORZ
states become accountable for the exercise of the government immigration power and are thus 
required to substantiate their assertions. For example, where a state claims that short-term 
migrants place an undue burden on national resources, supportive evidence should be provided. 
Finally, regional human rights adjudicating bodies can use expert opinions;174 this can be at the 
                                                          
173 Mantouvalou, supra n. 150, p. 118.  
174 The ECtHR has made relatively wide use of expert evidence (see e.g.: G. Cumming, Expert Evidence 
Deficiencies in the Judgments of the Courts of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights 
(The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2014). 
  
request of the parties or of their own motion.175 Expert opinions are there to assist human rights 
bodies with establishing and assessing evidence. Amicus curiae briefs ± notably briefs filed by 
NGOs - offer a means to bring expert knowledge to the attention of adjudicating bodies.176  A 
vulnerability analysis supports an extensive use of amicus curiae briefs akin to the practice 
developed by the IACtHR; for example, the Court has, in some instances, used its discretion 
DQGDVNHGIRULQWHUHVWHGJURXSV¶YLHZV177  
,PSRUWDQWO\UHJLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVDGMXGLFDWLQJERGLHV¶LQ-depth scrutiny of the exercise 
of the government immigration power complements their investigation into PLJUDQWV¶VRFLHWDO
and institutional relationships in the construction of informed narratives and human rights 
violation assessments. In-depth scrutiny does so by helping elucidate how migration laws and 
SROLFLHV VKDSH PLJUDQWV¶ H[SHULHQFHV DQG PLgratory patterns. In particular, the degree of 
scrutiny that a vulnerability analysis demands helps explicate the correlation between state 
DFWLRQLQWKHILHOGRIPLJUDWLRQDQGPLJUDQWV¶YXOQHUDELOLW\+RZWKHDGRSWLRQRIDVXEVWDQWLYH
standard of review affects human rights adjudication is discussed above in the context of the 
theorisation of vulnerability as an IHRL tool and below in relation to the articulation of 
UHVSRQVHVWRPLJUDQWV¶YXOQHUDELOLW\E\UHJLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVDGMXGLFDWLQJERGLHV 
4.2.2.2. Responding to 0LJUDQWV¶9XOQHUDELOLW\ 
A vulnerability analysis calls for a dynamic approach to the articulation of IHRL obligations 
congruent with their characterisation as resilience-building assets and the recognition of 
migrants as fully-fledged IHRL subjects. Factors that inhibit the response of international 
KXPDQULJKWVDGMXGLFDWLRQWRPLJUDQWV¶YXOQHUDELOLWLHVPXVWWKHUHIRUHEHUHPRYHGZKLFKDOWHUV
approaches to human rights adjudication in migrant cases.  
A vulnerability analysis first compels regional human rights adjudicating bodies to put 
human rights protection before the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration, thereby doing away 
ZLWKUHYHUVDOV7KLVµVXSUHPDF\¶RIKXPDQULJKWVFRQVWLWXWHVWKHXQGHUSLQQLQJSULQFLSOHIRUWKH
DVVHVVPHQW RI KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQV +DYLQJ LGHQWLILHG PLJUDQWV¶ YXOQHUDELOLWLHV KXPDQ
rights bodies are then required to act as asset-FRQIHUULQJLQVWLWXWLRQV ,PSRUWDQWO\PLJUDQWV¶
claims to protection and the articulation of IHRL obligations are no longer set against the 
                                                          
175 See e.g.: European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, 19 September 2016, Annex to the Rules, Rule A1 
(1) Investigative measures. 
176 $$0RKDPHG³,QGLYLGXDODQG1*23DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ+XPDQ5LJKWV/LWLJDWLRQEHIRUHWKH$IULFDn Court of 
+XPDQDQG3HRSOHV¶ULJKWV/HVVRQVIURPWKH(XURSHDQDQG,QWHU-$PHULFDQ&RXUWVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´MSU-
DCL Journal of International Law (1999), p. 377. 
177 Ibid., p. 391.  
  
exercise of the government immigration power. In particular, a vulnerability analysis facilitates 
the distribution of resilience-building assets to migrants in keeping with their recognition as 
fully-fledged IHRL subjects. Because a vulnerability analysis subjects stateV¶SROLF\FKRLFHVWR
in-depth scrutiny, unsubstantiated policy considerations can no longer constrain protection for 
migrants. Furthermore, while substantiated considerations can have some bearing on the range 
of IHRL obligations placed on states, these cannot result in migrants being pushed to the edges 
of human rights systems. Importantly, the adoption of a substantive standard of review of the 
exercise of the government immigration power and, more broadly, stateV¶ SROLF\ GHFLVLRQV
significantly reduces the margin of appreciation conferred on states, especially in matters of 
immigration policy and resource allocation. The requirement that states must implement their 
IHRL obligations to the maximum of their resources further expand their obligations vis-à-vis 
migrants.  
5. CONCLUSION 
A human rights-based approach to GIMG accounts for the three fundamental traits of 
international migration. It acknowledges that migration is a fundamentally human 
phenomenon.  This approach also accepts that humans are mobile and that international 
migration is a permanent world feature. Finally, it recognises that isolated state action cannot 
offer fitting responses to the global phenomenon that is international migration.  Because it 
rests on a sound understanding of the nature of international migration, a human rights-based 
approach provides the necessary framework for good GIMG.  
The recognition of international migration as a fundamentally human phenomenon 
makes human rights central to good GIMG. This very strong linkage between human rights 
and good migration governance, in turn, makes international human rights adjudication a key 
migration governance activity and human rights adjudicating bodies key GIMG actors. In this 
paper, I have focused on regional bodies because of the greater momentum of GIMG at the 
trans-regional level. However, this is not to say that multilateral activity should not be 
developed; on the contrary, the global nature of international migration makes multilateralism 
a significant facet of GIMG and trans-regional activity can provide incentives for multilateral 
developments. It follows that my argument in support of the transformation of regional human 
rights adjudicating bodies into GIMG actors extends to international bodies such as the Human 
Rights Committee or the Committee on the Rights of the Child.  
I accept that the transformation of human rights bodies into GIMG actors is hampered 
by the influence that the government immigration power exerts on IHRL. I have shown how 
the affirmation of the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration and the reversals it causes undermine 
  
protection for migrants, which frustrates the development of fair GIMG. Reversals are indeed 
incompatible with the conceptualisation of human rights as the core of GIMG. Reversals also 
thwart efficient governance. Because they significantly constrain stateV¶ ,+5/ REOLJDWLRQV
towards migrants, reversals facilitate the inequitable distribution of the costs and benefits of 
international migration; benefits are disproportionately apportioned to (wealthy) receiving 
states while costs are in the main borne by (poorer) states of origin. Critically, the significance 
afforded to the government immigration power yields narratives that are detached from the 
realities and complexities of international migration. Thus, rather than further efficient GIMG, 
international human rights adjudication contributes to the lack of coherence, viability, 
sustainability and knowledgebase that presently beset most attempts at GIMG.   
To enable the transformation of regional human rights adjudicating bodies into good 
GIMG actors, I advocate the deployment of a vulnerability analysis in international human 
rights adjudication. This analysis is premised on the conceptualisation of universal 
vulnerability as a foundation and tool of IHRL. A vulnerability analysis has a profound 
transformative effect on international human rights adjudication. First, it fundamentally alters 
the nature of the IHRL subject: the liberal invulnerable and nationalistic subject is replaced by 
the universal vulnerable subject. Secondly, with the development of a vulnerability analysis, 
,+5/ EHFRPHV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK EXLOGLQJ WKH YXOQHUDEOH VXEMHFW¶V UHVLOLHQFH 7KLUGO\ WKH
redefined function of IHRL morphs human rights bodies into asset-conferring institutions. 
Fourthly, a vulnerability analysis subjects the sWDWH¶V right to control immigration to the sWDWH¶V 
,+5/ REOLJDWLRQV )LQDOO\ EHFDXVH LW SURPSWV DQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR PLJUDQWV¶ VRFLHWDO DQG
institutional relationships as well as in-depth scrutiny of the exercise of the government 
immigration power, a vulnerability analysis produces narratives and human rights breach 
assessments that are grounded in the facts of international migration. Importantly, the merits 
of a vulnerability analysis are not confined to migrant cases; this approach is instrumental in 
making IHRL responsive to the vulnerabilities of all IHRL subjects.  
&ULWLFDOO\WKHDGYDQFHPHQWRIPLJUDQWV¶KXPDQULJKWVSURWHFWLRQWKDWDYXOQHUDELOLW\
analysis yields supports good GIMG. It recognises and strengthens the fundamental linkage 
between human rights and international migration. A vulnerability analysis further helps 
elucidate the dynamics of international migration. Importantly, a vulnerability analysis has the 
merit to produce migrant and migration narratives that are evidence-based rather than policy 
GULYHQ ,Q SDUWLFXODU LQYHVWLJDWLRQV LQWR PLJUDQWV¶ VRFLHWDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHODWLRQVKLSV
combined with in-depth scrutiny of the exercise of the government immigration power 
  
illuminate the sWDWH¶V role in the construction of the disadvantages associated with alienage.178 
Because it recognises the intrinsic human nature of international migration and seeks to 
understand this global phenomenon, a vulnerability analysis brings coherence to GIGM as well 
as supports sustainable and viable governance activity while promoting fairness.  
I accept that the deployment of a vulnerability analysis in international human rights 
adjudication presents significant challenges.  I recognise that it places great demands on 
regional human rights bodies and states.  A vulnerDELOLW\DQDO\VLVFRXOGEHVDLGWRµWDNHRQ¶WKH
sWDWH¶V ULJKWWRFRQWUROLPPLJUDWLRQWKHUHE\H[SRVLQJKXPDQULJKWVERGLHVWRµDFFXVDWLRQV¶RI
illegitimate activism and, in so doing, rendering human rights systems vulnerable.179 However, 
these claims are misplaced. A vulnerability analysis does not disable the government 
immigration power; rather it subjects its exercise to IHRL obligations to which states have 
subscribed. Thus, a vulnerability analysis can be said to foster legitimacy and accountability in 
the exercise of the government immigration power. Furthermore, as Judge Cançado Trindade 
and Dembour rightly point out, human rights adjudication approaches that submit to the sWDWH¶V 
will undermine protection standards and as such pose greater threats to human rights 
systems.180 Critically, the transformation of human rights bodies into asset-conferring 
institutions and the ensuing characterisation of IHRL obligations as resilience-building 
resources do not alter the nature of stateV¶µSUH-YXOQHUDELOLW\¶GXW\to respect, protect and fulfil 
KXPDQ ULJKWV 5DWKHU WKDQ µLPSRVH¶ D KXPDQ ULJKWV DGMXGLFDWLRQ µUHYROXWLRQ¶ RQ states, a 
vulnerability analysis gives greater substance to stateV¶,+5/REOLJDWLRQVLQNHHSLQJZLWKthe 
universal and humanistic premise of IHRL.  
 
                                                          
178 The term alienage is borrowed from Bosniak (L. Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of 
Contemporary Membership (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006). 
179 For example, Timmer opines that the concept of vulnerability is not without risks for the ECtHR; she 
REVHUYHVWKDW³WKH&RXUW¶VYHU\SURWHFWLRQRIHVSHFLDOO\YXOnerable and unwanted people renders the Court 
YXOQHUDEOHDQGXQZDQWHGLWVHOI´ $7LPPHU³$4XLHW5HYROXWLRQ9XOQHUDELOLW\LQWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI
+XPDQ5LJKWV´LQ0$)LQHPDQDQG$*UHDUHGV Vulnerability, Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation 
for Law and Politics (Farnham, Ashgate, 2013), p. 147,168). 
180 IACtHR (Concurring Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade), Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra n. 61, 
para. 87; and Dembour, supra n. 60, p. 312, 351. 
 
